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Abstract 
A producer of 5.4 M bbl/d, totalling almost half of the consumption of the entire European Union, 
the Gulf of Guinea is a fundamental lifeline and maritime link between Europe, the Americas and Africa. 
Geographically positioned as a staging post for transit originating in Latin America and coupled with its 
relatively porous borders, the region is also the perfect stepping stone for contraband heading to European 
shores. While blessed with an enviable wealth of marine and mineral resources, the region is also plagued by 
an ever-increasing spectre of maritime piracy; accounting for around 30% of incidents in African waters from 
2003 to 2011. It is for these reasons that this research centres around the issues of maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea, with a particular focus on the first two decades of the 21st century. This research looks to 
examine the overall picture of the present state of play in the area, before going on to provide an analysis of 
potential regional developments in maritime security. 
This research begins with the analysis of concepts/phenomena that have played a notable role in the 
shaping of the field of maritime security, namely Globalisation and security issues in the post-Cold War era. 
The ensuing chapter then focuses in on the Gulf of Guinea and the issues dominating the field of maritime 
security in the region. 
The penultimate chapter presents a SWOT analysis, undertaken as part of this research with the aim 
of correlating opinions from a variety of sectors/professions regarding maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea. 
The final chapter builds upon the results obtained from the abovementioned SWOT analysis, 
presenting a series of potential proposals/strategies that can contribute to the field of maritime security in 
the region over the coming years. 
This research draws to a close with the presentation of conclusions taken from this particular 
investigation, as well as a final overview of the earlier presented proposals applicable to the field of maritime 
security during the second decade of the 21st century. 
KEYWORDS: Gulf of Guinea, Security Studies, Maritime Security, Globalisation, Piracy, Organised Crime. 
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Introduction 
 
In a world in which more than 90% of total trade is transported by sea,1 the field of 
maritime security will inevitably grab headlines and attract the attention of policy makers 
as the XXI century progresses. With the maritime sector acting as the beating heart of 
global trade, transporting everything from the world’s energy and food supplies to 
consumer products, the stability and security of states in strategically significant maritime 
zones is capable of having a knock-on effect for individuals as well as the entire 
international community as a whole. 
 
To such an extend is the global market now interlinked and far-reaching between 
consumer markets, mass producers of raw materials and the world’s industrial basins, the 
field of maritime security now relies upon the cooperation of what are often seen as 
unstable states.2 While the very materials that are crucial for the feeding of developed 
nations that have benefited from the process of Globalisation traverse the world’s oceans, 
the safe and successful transportation of those materials is heavily dependent on the 
cooperation of actors to whom the same values and standards cannot be applied. 
 
One of the most pressing and perhaps vulnerable areas in terms of maritime 
security is the Gulf of Guinea.3 Indeed, with the region producing more than five million 
barrels of oil per day which must be transported by sea, totalling 40% of the total 
consumption of the 27 European Union Countries in 2011,4 any destabilisation that poses a 
threat to maritime security is sure to be of concern, while existing maritime security issues 
such as drug trafficking (with West Africa acting as a hub for between 8% to 13% of cocaine 
                                                          
1 International Maritime Organisation, 2011: 2  
2 Of the 15 ECOWAS Member States, five feature in the top 20 of the Failed States Index 2013, produced by 
the non-profit research organization the Fund for Peace, while another five enter into the top 50. (Fund for 
Peace, 2013) 
3 For the purposes of this research paper, the Gulf of Guinea will be based on a wider definition  that includes 
the region from Senegal to southern border of Angola (15°0’0”N to 15°0’0”S) – See Figure i. 
4 Chatham House, 2013: V 
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shipments heading for Europe5), human trafficking, arms trafficking, poaching and piracy 
also draw the focus of the international community’s spotlight. On a more local level, the 
same issues are just as hard hitting, with estimates of revenue losses caused by poaching 
alone exceeding the cost of servicing multilateral loans to the region.6 
 
As Globalisation continues to press forward at a seemingly unrelenting pace, the 
increasing importance of the maritime routes that pass through the Gulf of Guinea also 
brings a whole new approach to security in Africa, with the analysis of the field of maritime 
security gaining evermore momentum in comparison to the more traditional approaches of 
state/regime and land-based security. 
 
It is in this context that this research paper will examine the importance of maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea, thereby touching on the region’s newly found importance as 
a maritime route, bolstered by recently discovered rich offshore hydrocarbon deposits as a 
potential fracture point capable of having an effect which extends well beyond the sub-
region and into the advanced, as well as advancing, world. This paper will approach the 
topic mindful of the role that the international community can and will in all probability 
come to play in the future of maritime security in what has essentially become one of the 
most dangerous maritime areas in the world over the last decade.7 
 
The foundations of this research paper’s methodology will be focused around the 
applicability of existing international relations theory to maritime security in the region, as 
well as the role that Globalisation has played in shaping not only the Gulf of Guinea, but 
maritime security as a whole. An empirical (SWOT) analysis of ideas and opinions will 
follow, with data provided via a questionnaire completed by actors who are directly linked 
to the topic and who have their own vested interests in maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea then building on this research paper’s initial theoretical basis. 
                                                          
5 UNODC, 2013: 17 
6 Gilpin, 2007: 1 
7 International Crisis Group, 2012: i 
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The paper will finish with the presentation of the results of that same analysis, 
thereby using the data/information provided to elaborate on proposals that could be of 
use to the field of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea in the near future. 
 
Figure i: States in the Gulf of Guinea8 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Plutonius 3D, 2014 
  
                                                          
8 For the purposes of this paper, the Gulf of Guinea will be defined as the area of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean 
from 15°0’0”N to 15°0’0”S, thereby including the 17 states in the region that have a maritime border, namely: 
Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Togo. 
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1. Maritime Security – A Changing Field 
1.1  The Post-Cold War Era 
 
This chapter will approach the field of maritime security as one that is in a constant state of 
flux, with the influence of countless actors and developments shifting it into sometimes, 
but not invariably, unchartered territory. As an opening note, it is worth affirming that the 
field of maritime security is nothing new, but rather the culmination of issues which have 
remained ever-present during centuries of seafaring exploration, trade and expansion. 
 
The very concept of security is, without doubt, one that has altered in shape and 
approach with the beginning of the post-Cold War era, particularly when applied to the 
field of maritime security. While tensions between the USA and the USSR where at their 
height, it was fundamentally superpower politics, technology and the nuclear stalemate 
that underpinned the debates and policy that defined the security agenda of the day.9 
 
“Traditionally, maritime strategists have been concerned with the threat of 
interstate confrontation, i.e. with naval power as a pillar of national defence and 
capability. For instance, during the Cold War, the US Navy’s main task, as defined 
in the Maritime Strategy adopted in the mid-1980s, was to deter attacks, and, in 
the event that deterrence failed, be prepared to engage in and win a war against 
the Soviet Union’s Navy.”(Jopling, 2010) 
 
Essentially, the thawing of the Cold War drew a line under what had been the meta-
narrative which had driven security policy for the best part of five consecutive decades. The 
loss of the Soviet Union meta-event forced a recalculation of approaches to security, but 
the relatively peaceful manner in which a world superpower had crumbled and the 
apparent newly-found importance of non-state actors under narratives such as the War on 
Terror and organised crime etc. marked a notable shift in approach towards the tackling of 
                                                          
9 Buzan and Hansen, 2010: 155 
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non-traditional security issues. Essentially, with the threat of outright war diminished, the 
very concept of security and those who study it have been given the green light to reach 
out into other fields. 
 
“The absence of threats is sufficiently far reaching for Security Studies to 
encompass dangers that range from pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, and 
environmental degradation, through to the more readily associated security 
concerns of direct violence, such as terrorism and inter-state armed conflict.” 
(Collins, 2010, p. 1) 
 
Not only are issues of security now more diverse, but the actors involved now 
include the public as well as the private; in an interdependent power-play in which events 
far afield can have unexpected effects in our own backyard. Spurred on by an evermore 
interconnected global economy, i.e. the result of Globalisation, the field of maritime 
security has also seen its own rise: emerging as a policy and study area that has moved the 
field away from something viewed as transport security to something that is now a crucial 
foundation of international and geopolitical relations.10 In a reflection of that same 
interconnectivity, the issues grabbing the present-day headlines in the field of maritime 
security are now often a cause for security concerns which are to such an extent 
interlinked that they cannot be feasibly separated or tackled independently.11 
 
“…the global political and economic system is more complicated and complex than 
ever before. More sectors, more states more issues and more private actors are 
involved in interdependent relationships. It is increasingly unrealistic to analyse 
world politics as occurring solely among a group of large states, solid as billiard 
balls, bouncing off each other in a balance of power.” (Nye and Welch, 2013: 273) 
 
                                                          
10 Amirell, 2013: 1 
11 Buzan et al., 1998: 201 
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While this paper focuses more specifically on the state of maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea, it should also be noted that the conditions which define the discipline in the 
region are far from being unique to that particular part of the globe. Indeed, similar 
developments can also be seen in other parts of the world and are essentially the result of 
global maritime conditions born out of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, as the thawing of 
the Cold War saw global actors diminish their naval footprint around the world.12 For 
example, maritime piracy is often just as much of an issue in East Asia as it is in West and 
indeed East Africa. Such incidents have seen the international community come together in 
an unparalleled example of multinational maritime security cooperation far beyond the 
territorial waters of the states providing military assets.13 Moreover, international 
organisations with roles not readily associated with the field, for example the World Food 
Programme (WFP), are now also involved in such missions, making for a clear indication of 
just how important the field of maritime security is going to be as the 21st century 
progresses. 
 
In tracing the roots of present-day non-traditional maritime security issues, we can 
certainly look to the dissipation of the need to project military prowess far afield with the 
culmination of the Cold War and the end of colonial rule. What resulted was a shift 
towards the upkeep of territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that saw 
countries focus their resources more locally. That proliferation of actors and diffusion of 
maritime power, including in areas where resources are often already stretched before the 
sustainable management of national maritime domains is even addressed, has essentially 
seen the emergence of other maritime actors to fill the void created by security threats 
that have not been matched by an ability to tackle them.14 In essence, access to what have 
long been considered as global maritime commons is no longer something guaranteed by 
the application of a global hegemonic power or multilateral regimes.15 
                                                          
12 Amirell, 2013: 6 
13 One such example of this cooperation is Operation Atalanta, also known as European Union Naval Force 
Somalia (EU-NAVFOR-ATALANTA). 
14 Behr et al., 2013: 8 
15 Ibid: 2 
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Perhaps such a situation was to be somewhat expected, as the dismantling of the 
Soviet fleet saw the world assume that a return to some form of the Mare Liberum concept 
would pave the way for actors from a range of fields to fall into a somewhat false sense of 
security. What had been forgotten is that the safety of strategic maritime zones and sea 
lanes is not necessarily an inherent situation to be found across the world’s oceans, but 
rather something which had traditionally depended on the ability of global actors to 
project naval power far beyond their own territorial waters.16 This concept is nothing new 
and can actually be traced back the era of expansive European colonial power, when 
trading companies were in a relative decline and imperial navies took on the burden of 
ensuring secure passage for trade to such an extent that the dominant Mahanist theory of 
the day drew clear lines between navies, the control of shipping lanes and the prosperity of 
any particular state.17 However, the modern global market context presents very different 
challenges. The nature of the modern economy is increasingly focused on transnational 
trade and capitalism via open competition and instant communication based on 
technology, thereby pulling apart the traditional linkage between the fielding of blue-water 
navies (the mere presence of which was often enough to deter what are today considered 
as non-traditional security threats18) and economic interests.19 
 
1.2 International Security Studies and Maritime Security 
  
Looking strictly at maritime security as an academic field, it becomes clear that it is one 
that has inevitably been linked with the overarching field of International Security Studies 
(ISS) and its offshoots. Of course, the wide scope of the idea of ‘security’ is one that 
encompasses a huge array of ideas and what may be viewed as issues specifically related to 
the field of maritime security are often inextricably linked with areas such as territorial 
                                                          
16 Amirell, 2013: 5-6 
17 See Mahan, 1890 for a comprehensive overview of the relationship between national wealth and naval 
power. 
18 Amirell, 2013: 6 
19 Grove, 1990: 4 
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security; with what happens at sea often having a knock-on effect, or being a result of, 
issues which occur on terra firma.20 While the field of ISS took upon greater importance 
with the development of academic interest stemming from issues such as the Cold War and 
decolonisation, the long-standing notion of the influence of Sea Power21 and the study of 
naval strategy dominated the study of those issues which are now beginning to be 
considered as the field of maritime security. Despite this, certain security concerns which 
began to draw the attention of policy makers in the maritime domain during the later 
stages of the 20th century, such as economic, environmental and food security, have to a 
large extent been engulfed by the field of human security,22 despite the potential impact 
that maritime issues can have on those topics. 
 
The non-traditional security issues thrown up since the end of the Cold War, 
particularly within the sphere of maritime security, shift focus away from a strictly military-
based doctrine (which had traditionally captured the focus of ISS and International 
Relations as a whole) and the need to be ready to respond to aggression from an opposing 
state, towards a general acceptance that the deep and complex societal, economic, 
political and technological linkages between states creates a mutual vulnerability23 that can 
no longer be addressed by any one single nation or particular field alone. It is that very 
sense of mutual vulnerability that triggers some of the more in depth academic debates 
when applying already existing concepts of security. Such mutual concern will inevitably 
result in an increased interest in the field of maritime security by not only individual states, 
but also collections of states and non-state actors alike. Such an interest poses a tasking 
academic debate, particularly in the field of International Security Studies, should it be 
noted that the referent object of many ISS perspectives, as well as the sectors which they 
address, are often focused on the role/predominance of the state (see table 1.1) as a 
singular actor, rather than as part of a larger grouping. 
                                                          
20 Klein, 2011: 4 
21 For an extensive analysis of the influence of Sea Power upon history, particularly its importance in the 
development of commerce and colonialism, see Mahan, 1890. 
22 Amirell, 2013: 8 
23 Ullman, 1983: 129 
Page | 12 
 
Table 1.1 ISS Perspectives 
 
ISS Perspective Referent object Securitising Sectors 
Strategic Studies The state Military 
Poststructuralist Security Studies the State Collective-individual Military-Political 
Post-colonial Security Studies States and Collectives All 
Peace Research State, societies, individuals All 
Human Security The individual All 
Feminist Security Studies individual, women All 
Critical Security Studies Individual All 
The Copenhagen School 
Collectivities and the 
environment 
All 
Conventional Constructivism The state Military 
Critical Constructivism Collectivities Military 
 
Source: adapted from Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 38 
 
While other ISS perspectives are also suitable for application in a deeper analysis of 
the field of maritime security, the importance of non-state actors (i.e. collectivities) and 
non-traditional security issues as referent objects acts as the centre pin around which the 
Copenhagen School’s perspective revolves; therefore positioning this particular perspective 
well for application in the analysis of the field of maritime security in the post-Cold War 
era. Developing as a result of increasing academic interest in the role played by securitising 
actors (not necessarily military, as is the case with various other ISS perspectives), the 
Copenhagen School is particularly useful in the analysis of what have traditionally been 
largely neglected security topics24 that nowadays play a crucial role in the broader issues 
that contribute to greater levels of maritime ‘insecurity’. 
 
Should the focus remain on use of military force by the securitising actor which 
wields it, namely the state, then the absence of protection from powerful navies that can 
be observed (see figure 1.2) does pose an interesting conceptual challenge to the field of 
Security Studies. However, the Copenhagen School’s approach, which broadens the 
definition of securitising actors to include the role of all actors, i.e. political leaders, 
                                                          
24 McDonald, 2013: 72 
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bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups,25 who securitise an issue 
(defined as a ‘referent object’) is particularly useful when approaching the broad range of 
topics encompassed by the field of maritime security.  
 
Figure 1.2 U.S. Navy Active Ships 
 
Source: adapted from Naval History and Heritage Command, 2011 
 
The Copenhagen School provides an approach which tackles the exclusivity of the 
use of military power when addressing the concept of security. This is of particular 
relevance when considering that the traditional role of military tools in International 
Relations is to protect referent objects that revolve around the upkeep of the state. 
 
“A Narrow interpretation of security concentrates on the state and its defence 
from external military attacks. In response to this narrow definition of security, 
other approaches to security studies have called for a widening and deepening of 
security to include non-military issues.” (Emmers, 2010: 137) 
 
One such example of the increased importance of non-military means as relative to 
this research paper’s focus can be found in what appears to be the start of an era marked 
                                                          
25 Buzan et al. 1998: 36 
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by less state and more private responsibility for maritime security.26 Indeed, the shipping 
industry is increasingly turning to the use of private mercenary forces and security 
companies to bolster security. Largely involved in efforts to tackle piracy, particularly off 
the coast of Somalia at the turn of the 21st century, these companies are now increasingly 
relied upon as a method for protecting cargos and crews transiting through some of the 
world’s more problematic maritime zones.27 Indeed, to such an extent has private security 
now taken on a role in protection at sea, the IMO has actually taken steps to regulate the 
industry.28 
 
Also essential to the Copenhagen School’s approach is the notion of securitising 
actors. Centring precisely on this paper’s geographical area of study, namely the Gulf of 
Guinea, the field of maritime security clearly has two very different groups of securitising 
actors; namely those who have a vested interest in the area by virtue of their geographical 
position (for the purposes of this research paper, designated as native actors); and those 
who are not native to the area but who have a vested interest in an area by virtue of its 
strategic, geopolitical and economic worth (for the purposes of this research paper, 
designated as non-native actors). 
 
While more traditional International Relations theories which focus on the state can 
be used to identify the power centres behind the security process(es) of native actors, the 
leeway provided by the Copenhagen School allows for the identification of other vectors 
when addressing non-native actors. 
 
In 21st century maritime security, non-state actors such as international shipping 
agencies or oil companies, as well as international organisations and other non-military 
actors, are often the focal point of attempts to raise awareness regarding particular 
                                                          
26 Amirell, 2013: 6 
27 Liss, 2009: 1 
28 For example, see International Maritime Organisation, 2012a 
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threats. Moreover, it is often those same entities taking steps to address those threats, 
rather than any form of state apparatus.29 
 
Working from the basis that a securitising actor is an actor who securitises an issue, 
namely a referent object, by declaring it as existentially threatened,30 both native and non-
native groupings of actors will inevitably focus on differing security issues and therefore 
differing referent objects, depending on the geographical proximity of a particular threat. 
For example, for native actors the issues affecting present-day maritime security may pose 
an existential threat to the referent objects of national sovereignty31 or ideology (both 
referent objects being issues of political security), as maritime-fuelled issues such as large-
scale organised crime, piracy and illicit trafficking have a significant detrimental effect on 
those actors, whereas the existential threat posed to non-native actors is more pressing to 
the referent object of economies (economic security). 
 
It is generally more likely that a great number of referent objects will be of concern 
to native actors due to their geographical proximity, when compared to non-native actors; 
especially should the Copenhagen School’s method of highlighting survival as being the 
driving force behind security be kept in mind. Should different forms of threats originating 
in the maritime sphere also be considered, it is arguable that each threat is likely to have a 
varying effect on the same security vector for native and non-native actors (see figure 1.3 
for a preliminary comparison of the potential impact of a maritime security issue in the 
Gulf of Guinea on native and non-native actors). 
                                                          
29 An Example outside of the military and political security sector defined as part of the Copenhagen School 
can be found in the economic security sector, namely in the form of the International Chamber of 
Commerce’s specialised maritime department known as the International Maritime Bureau (IMB). The IMB is 
a non-governmental and non-profit organisation funded by voluntary donations, designed to raise awareness 
within the shipping industry (see International Maritime Bureau, 2014). 
30 Buzan et al., 1998: 36 
31 Williams, 2013: 4 uses Buzan’s work in providing a breakdown of the idea of referent objects and the 
security sectors under which they can be categorised, dividing between the security sectors of: military 
security, political security, economic security, societal security and environmental security. In summary, 
military security is concerned with the interplay between the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of 
the state; political security is focused on the organisational stability of states/systems and ideologies that give 
legitimacy; economic security revolves around access to resources, finance and markets; societal security is 
concerned with the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere. 
Page | 16 
 
Figure 1.3 Effects of a local threat on referent objects 
 
 
Source: referent object labels are adapted from those provided in Emmers, 2010: 137, as 
based upon Buzan’s original Copenhagen School research 
 
What is clear from both figures is that the threat types included, which are issues of 
maritime security in their application (the core motivations behind such threats and their 
iimplications are, of course, more extensive), are all more exitentially threating issues for 
native actors in comparison to non-native actors. Moreover, none of the threats utilised 
are likely to cause direct damage to the military security of non-native actors. Rather the 
focus of non-native actors will likely centre on economic security, due to the vulnerability 
of maritime transport routes. The splitting of actors into native and non-native groupings 
and the extent to which each is likely to be damaged by the noted threats also touches 
upon another core themes approached in literature on the Copenhagen School, namely the 
idea of societal security.32 Initially developed as an analysis for the causes of conflicts in 
Eastern Europe, the concept is applicable to the identification of the motivation behind the 
intervention of non-native actors. Should a society, in being the mass which makes up the 
                                                          
32 Wæver et al., 1993 first presented the concept of ‘societal security’. 
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nation state, be able to maintain its position and character in the face of a threat,33 it can 
be concluded that a society would consider such a threat as being less than existential in 
terms of severity and would therefore and refrain from intervening. 
 
Specifically noteworthy relative to the organised crime threat is how such a threat 
could affect the two groupings of actors in varying ways. While organised crime may have 
an effect on the political and economic security of both groups, it is for very different 
reasons. For native actors, organised crime arguably encourages corruption34 that, if left 
unchecked, can have a disastous effect on a state’s economy and international credability. 
As an example of this we need to look no further than Guinea Bissau, which is often 
branded with the undesirable label of the world’s first “Narco-State”. 
 
“The pervasive power of the corruption of criminal organisations, coupled with a 
general crisis by state actors in the administration of justice and enforcement of 
the rule of law, contribute towards the progressive diminishing of the credibility of 
the state as the institution entrusted with the prerogatives of guaranteeing 
security (of people and investments) and dispensing justice. In this context, the 
case of Guinea Bissau is probably the clearest example of what West African states 
may face in the near future if the issues of justice and security are not properly 
and promptly addressed.” (Mazzitelli, 2007: 1071) 
 
While, non-native actors are also affected by organised crime in terms of political 
security, it is not for reasons of the organisability of states or systems of government, but 
rather due to the ideology that gives such actors legitimacy.35 Should the concept of the 
Responsibility to Protect be taken into consideration in conjunction with the organised 
crime phenomena of drug trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea as a stepping stone to Europe, 
                                                          
33 Wæver et al., 1993: 23 notes societal security as being “the ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible actual threats.” 
34 Chêne, 2008: 7 discusses this matter, but does affirm that additional research is need in this area. 
35 This definition of different referent objects within the political security sector is provided by Williams, 2013: 
4, as based on Buzan, 1991. 
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then the moral repercussions for the political security of non-native actors become 
obvious. In short, the tons of illegal narcotics being transited through Western Africa (see 
figure 1.4) on their way to foreign markets is an issue that non-native actors must, out of 
ideological necessity, address. 
 
Figure 1.4 Cocaine transiting West Africa en route to Europe 
 
Source: adapted from data provided in UNODC, 2013 
 
1.3 Maritime Security, Securitisation and the Speech Act 
 
Another key step in following the Copenhagen School’s methodology is the act of 
securitisation, as well as the process leading up to and following on from that act. Indeed, it 
is during this step that the earlier noted ideas of an existential threat and referent objects 
come into their own. As a perceived existential threat to a particular referent object is 
identified by a security actor in one of the sectors elaborated on earlier, an attempt to 
move that threat onto the security agenda is made, namely through the effort to convince 
a relevant audience of the need for a response through extraordinary means.36 It is in the 
act of moving an issue onto the political agenda (at this stage considered as ‘politicised’ 
issues) and then convincing a relevant audience of an existential threat and a need to take 
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extraordinary measure that the Copenhagen School moves into the realm of securitisation 
(see figure 1.5). Specifically relative to the challenges faced in the maritime security 
domain, the Copenhagen approach is of course tried and tested, with distinguished authors 
having already analysed issues such as transnational crime as a security threat.37 
 
Figure 1.5 The Copenhagen School’s approach 
 
Source: adapted from the ‘Security Spectrum’ in Emmers, 2010: 138 and McDonald 2013: 73 
 
A key step developed by the Copenhagen School effectively bridges the gap 
between what is essentially a ‘politicised’ issue and what is a ‘securitised’ one. That step is 
taken in the form of the speech act, which is, in a nutshell, the discourse made by an actor 
to a relevant audience in a way that attempts to securitise an issue by giving it a priority 
that sees it recognised as an existential threat and that pushes for the utilisation of 
extraordinary means for the resolution of that issue.38 
 
While the specifics of what exactly the process to securitise an issue is have been 
exhaustively examined,39 the Copenhagen approach of including the speech act40 as the 
centre-pin which moves an issue from being politicised to being securitised is particularly 
useful when studying the field of maritime security. Indeed, the usefulness and applicability 
of the speech act should not be overlooked, especially in such a fast-paced environment 
where the need to make timely decisions and allocate resources in times of emergency can 
                                                          
37 For example, see Emmers, 2003 on transnational organised crime in South East Asia. 
38 Buzan et al., 1998: 26 
39 For example, see Wæver, 1995: 48-86. 
40 See Buzan et al., 1998 for further reading on the ‘Speech act’. 
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be crucial. Moving an issue out of the realm of everyday politics and into the realm of 
‘emergency politics’ allows that issue to be dealt with swiftly and without the baggage of 
policy cycles and regulations.41 In short, the nature of security threats in the maritime 
realm and the way that they are addressed goes a long way to validating the theoretical 
basis of the speech act. 
 
A specifically relevant example of the speech act and securitisation in the maritime 
domain comes in the form of the attention given to the defence of international sea lanes 
following the September the 11th 2001 attacks on the United States. As part of a broad 
kneejerk reaction to secure vital transport routes in the face of such persuasive discourse 
by world leaders, states (via the United Nations) quickly went about empowering the IMO 
to move ahead with the International Ship and Port Security Code42 to increase the security 
of ships and harbour facilities in what is a reflection of securitisation and the role of the 
speech act in reaction to a perceived existential threat posed by potential terrorist attacks 
in the maritime domain.43 44 
 
There are of course many other examples of the applicability of the concept of 
securitisation to the maritime security realm, but one of the most diverse is without doubt 
the issue of drug trafficking. Indeed, this specific issue acts as a prime case study of how 
particular issues can become securitised for very different reasons, depending on the 
content of the speech acts which encourage their acceptance as existential threats at 
particular times throughout history. Examples of speech acts by non-native actors in this 
area stretch back as far as the early 1960’s, originating in the UN’s Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, 1961. In stark contrast to 21st century policy, this early mention of the ‘drug 
problem’ focused almost exclusively on societal security. 
 
                                                          
41 Taureck, 2006: 55 
42 For a full overview of the ISPS Code, see International Maritime Organisation, 2014. 
43 Schneider, 2013: 9 
44 International Maritime Organisation, 2014 
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“…Parties to the Convention are concerned with the health and welfare of 
mankind and are conscious of their duty to prevent and combat the evil of drug 
addiction….Considering that, while drug addiction leads to personal degradation 
and social disruption, it happens very often that the deplorable social and 
economic conditions in which certain individuals and certain groups are living 
predispose them to drug addiction…Recognizing that social factors have a certain 
and sometimes preponderant influence on the behaviour of individuals and 
groups.” (UNODC, 1961: 12) 
 
Discourse on this same issue has been developed by the same actor on several 
occasions as the 20th century progressed, however references to both economic and 
political security later begin to appear as drug trafficking picked up the pace, in what is a 
notable reorientation of existential threat discourses by non-native actors towards a focus 
on the state itself, rather than society.45 
 
“…Deeply concerned by the magnitude of and rising trend in the illicit production 
of, demand for and traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, which 
pose a serious threat to the health and welfare of human beings and adversely 
affect the economic, cultural and political foundations of society.” (UNODC, 1988: 
10) 
 
This change in discourse acts as a solid indication of how what is essentially the 
same issue, vis-à-vis the same existential threat, can be used in application to very different 
referent objects. Perhaps this comes as little surprise, should the nature any particular 
existential threat be considered as a phenomena governed by the specific political and 
social contexts which created them,46 rather than being some sort of universally objective 
condition. 
                                                          
45 Crick, 2012: 1 
46 Grayson, 2003: 338 
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In following the line of dividing actors between native and non-native mentioned 
earlier, the question of who actually makes speech acts is inevitably relevant. On the more 
local level, the result of a speech act is naturally easier identify, as the engine behind 
discursive representations of an issue as being an existential threat, that is the successful 
securitisation of an issue, can be expected to be governments or politically enabled entities 
which by definition have an advantage in pushing for the utilisation of means outside of 
that which would be considered as run-of-the-mill situations.47 That advantage and the 
added success in lobbying by native actors for a response to an identified existential threat 
means that more examples will be readily available and, to that end, identifiable. 
 
“The more power a securitising actor has the more likely this actor will succeed in 
attempted securitisation and gain the consent of audience.” (Coskun, 2007: 11) 
 
Indeed, much of the original work around the speech act focused more specifically 
on the role of state actors, rather than the increasing role of other actors in the economic, 
social or environmental spheres. 
 
“By uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development 
into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means 
necessary to block it.” (Wæver, 1995: 55) 
 
Although the innate advantage of native actors is theoretically present, the 
discursive nature of the speech act and the resources/influence needed to effectively 
address an existential threat poses a curious challenge to some native actors. Assuming 
that the successful securitisation of an issue involves a metaphorical representation of an 
existential threat to a referent object by securitising actor,48 it follows that the securitising 
actor will require access to some form of means, or require some form of resource, 
                                                          
47 Collins, 2005: 565 
48 Buzan et al., 1998: 27 provides an overview of the idea ‘security of silence’ and the authors who have 
examined the issue. 
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through which that actor can articulate a securitising discourse. Should native actors not 
have access to such means, then it will prove to be exceptionally difficult for native actors 
to effectively address any form of existential threat. This idea of ‘security of silence’49 is 
certainly applicable to the native actors which are the focus of this particular study, namely 
those located in the Gulf of Guinea. Such extreme poverty levels and lack of governance50 
which are present in some regions of the Gulf of Guinea will result in a situation in which 
many security issues will fall by the wayside, as certain groups do not have the tools 
through which to articulate their concerns. Moreover, the political and societal conditions 
and norms needed for a given security actor to successfully make a security speech may 
not always be present across the entire region.51  
 
“At the micro end of the spectrum, individuals or small groups can seldom 
establish a wider security legitimacy in their own right. They may speak about 
security to and of themselves, but few will listen.” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23) 
 
Internationally, or rather externally, the situation inevitably becomes more 
complex. There are of course states powerful enough to project their power well beyond 
their national borders, but the vastness of the maritime domain, coupled with the nature 
of the modern nation-state system in which national sovereignty is enshrined as the most 
precious tenant of the international political arena, sees most categorised as part of what is 
identified as ‘international society’.52 While it may be the case that many supranational 
organisations which make up international society are delegated roles and powers which 
can influence decisions and policies normally monopolised by sovereign states,53 there is 
                                                          
49 Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 216-217 
50 McGuire, 2010: 6 notes that many states “in the region are empirically weak: they lack the capacity to 
deliver public goods and services to their citizens, do not claim effective control over their territories and are 
marked by high levels of official corruption.” 
51 This issue stems from what has been critiqued as being the Western/Euro-centric foundation of the 
Copenhagen School by authors such as Anthony et al. 2006 and Wilkinson, 2007, with the areas of economic 
and societal security being particularly based upon a Western perspective. 
52 See Bull and Watson, 1984 for an overview of the idea of international society. 
53 Nye and Welch 2013: 196 affirm that although the sovereignty of nation states is a crucial pillar of many 
international organisations, “international law and organization are an important part of political reality 
because they affect the way states behave.” 
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still the question of the increasing role of non-state actors who have the ability to 
effectively articulate a speech act in a way that sees an issue become accepted as an 
existential threat through a successful securitisation process. However, the wider context 
supported by the Copenhagen School allows for the identification of security actors other 
than those who specifically compose the state apparatus. NGOs, international companies 
and even think tanks evidently have a part to play in the security discourse.54 Such entities 
are evermore transnational in their presence and influence, playing an increasing role in 
pressing the policies of governments and policy makers. Although without the hard power 
monopolised by states, such entities find their footing socially and economically as a way to 
influence decisions; bolstered of course by the modern interconnectivity of the globalised 
world.55 More recent academic works have also affirmed the theoretical basis for the 
involvement of non-state actors in such discourse.56 
 
“The initial move of securitization can be initiated by states but also by non-state 
actors such as trade unions or popular movements. Non-state actors are thus 
regarded as important players in the securitization model.” (Emmers, 2010: 139) 
 
Curiously, while securitising actors may vary between native and non-native 
groupings, the nature of the maritime domain does mean that the target audience of those 
actors is often essentially the same; namely the capabilities and policies of nation states. 
When direct action is needed, the specialised resources needed to police the high seas at 
the actual flash point of an issue and, in some cases, to enter into live conflict, are all but 
monopolised by nation states in the form of expensive naval assets,57 meaning that states 
will inevitably be the focal point for attempted speech acts. This explanation does however 
only centre on the tacking of issues directly and, should the underlying causality of a 
security issue be the focus of a securitising actor rather than that the actual point of 
                                                          
54 For example, see UNODC, 2012, in which corporate chiefs from 35 top German companies urged their 
government to ratify a UN Convention against corruption. 
55 Nye and Welch, 2013: 302 
56 Ibid 
57 Such a monopolisation is not only borne out of the sheer cost of fielding naval assets, but also as a result of 
the exclusivity of use of military force by nation states. 
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friction, it follows that target audiences will also begin to vary. For example, native 
groupings would be more effective in tackling corruption brought about in part by 
maritime security issues58 should they appeal to a political audience or elements of civil 
society capable of bringing officials found to be involved to accountability, while non-native 
groups would be best served by focusing on relevant audiences within the business 
community.59 
 
Essentially, what are being addressed by non-native actors interested in maritime 
security are threats which are, in general, low Intensity. It is precisely this low level of 
intensity that such threats pose that leaves policy makers and other security actors uneasy 
when it comes to any form of intervention. Giving legitimacy to a threat as a national 
security issue will inevitably be complicated should it be difficult to identify direct and 
immediate damage resulting from that threat, even though such threats often embody a 
whole host of causes and consequences which are difficult to predict in foresight.60 Why 
those threats are of a low intensity is without doubt linked to their geographical proximity. 
On the contrary, native groupings are much more likely to see such threats as being of a 
high intensity, due to their geographical proximity and immediately identifiable damage. 
 
Table 1.6 Intensity of threats 
Low intensity non-native High intensity native 
Diffuse Specific 
Distant (space) Close (space) 
Distant (time) Close (time) 
Low probability High probability 
Low consequences High consequences 
Historically neutral Historically amplified 
 
Source: Buzan, 2007: 123 
                                                          
58 A linkage between large-scale drug trafficking and the resulting exposure to money laundering and 
corruption is outlined in UN Economic and Security Council, 2009: 8. 
59 Gumede, 2012: 6-7 
60 Buzan, 2007: 123 
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Having established which parties are involved in the discourse/speech act process 
relative to maritime security threats, an analysis of the success of attempts to securitise 
issues naturally follows. Rather, the prerequisite of the need for a security issue to be 
accepted as such by a relevant audience. Arguably, it is not simply enough for a particular 
security actor to undertake a discourse pushing for the securitisation of an issue for that 
issue to be accepted as such. There must be an acknowledgement by that audience which 
produces substance; a measurable effect.61 That measurable effect is essentially the green 
light being given to the taking of extraordinary measures against what is deemed to be an 
existential threat. 
 
“If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential 
threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he 
or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.” 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 25) 
 
The division comes when an issue, in having been the subject of an identifiable 
security discourse aimed to insight extraordinary measures to be taken, must actually be 
addressed via those measures, or where an issue can still be considered as securitised 
without such measures being taken. Certain maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea 
are of relevance here. For example, although the seriousness and need for urgency in 
tackling the issue of piracy, which is fuelled in large part by the disorder of a mushrooming 
regional oil industry,62 has been highlighted in what are clear examples of the speech act,63 
the actual implementation of extraordinary measures have been largely limited to 
attempts by international organisations to encourage legislative processes at the local 
level. Despite a reported one in every five piracy attacks in 2013 (with estimations that only 
                                                          
61 Emmers, 2010: 139 
62 UNODC, 2013: 45 affirms the importance of that industry, stating: “There is a booming black market for 
fuel in West Africa. Without this ready market, there would be little point in attacking these vessels. There 
are indications that oil may also be smuggled outside the region.” 
63 For example, the International Crisis Group, 2012: ii, in referring to the issue states: “A range of urgent 
measures is needed to reverse this trend: reforms to improve governance of the economy and security 
sector, comprehensive and effective maritime public policies and practical regional cooperation beyond 
declarations of intent.” 
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about one third of incidents in the region are actually reported) taking place in the Gulf of 
Guinea, many of which are remarkably more violent than previous incidents in other parts 
of the globe,64 no large-scale multinational task force, such as that deployed to tackle 
piracy off Somalia, has been tasked to the region. That is not to say, however, that the 
issue has not been securitised, especially with speech acts on the topic being so readily 
available. The Copenhagen School has actually touched on the theoretical need for action, 
affirming that the taking of extraordinary measures is not specifically a necessity. Rather 
the acceptance of an issue as an existential threat is what should be considered as the 
inescapable prerequisite for an issue to be considered as securitised.65 
 
There appears to be an innate curiosity to the world’s approach to maritime 
security threats in the Gulf of Guinea is that actors involved in the region, particularly non-
native actors, have seen that it can be more effective to move what are issues securitised 
by discourse back into the realm politicised issues. What may once have been considered 
as extraordinary measures to tackle certain existential threats, such as the creation of 
international entities such as SEACOP, MAOC (N), US Africa Station, Cape Verde’s COSMAR 
etc. to deal with maritime security issues, are now part of the everyday political processes 
of the actors involved. That is not to say that the issues being addressed are no longer 
existential threats, but rather that a much needed and more desirable long term footprint 
is better established through the politicisation of issues, rather than any sort of ad hoc and 
temporary securitisation; Extreme politicisation it may be, but politicisation nonetheless. 
Arguably, a long term approach to such existential threats, namely through the 
continuation of securitisation discourses over longer (non-temporary) periods, is more 
likely to encourage the provision of assets and resources of a more permanent nature 
compared to extraordinary measures focused on an extraordinary and immediate solution 
to a particular existential threat.66 
 
                                                          
64 Foreign Policy, 2014 
65 Buzan et al. 1998: 25 
66 Abrahamsen, 2005: 71 
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1.4 Globalisation and Maritime Security 
 
“Today, international trade has evolved to the point where almost no nation can 
be fully self-sufficient. Every country is involved, at one level or another, in the 
process of selling what it produces and acquiring what it lacks: none can be 
dependent only on its domestic resources.” (International Maritime Organisation, 
2012b: 7) 
 
There can be little doubt that Globalisation is the most defining aspect of the current 
international system.67 It is the effects, both direct and indirect, of Globalisation that have 
governed the economic, social, political and environmental development, whether seen as 
a positive or negative, of the planet which we live on today. If there is any one particular 
phenomenon which can be given credit for the rise of the field of maritime security, then it 
is without doubt Globalisation. A rise largely as a consequence of the radically different 
nature of the global economy, rather than being something that has itself acted as a 
spearhead for change, the field of maritime security is drastically different now compared 
to how it was 100, or even as recent as 20, years ago. In more recent times, maritime 
security is something that has been inextricably linked to the Globalisation of transport 
security, namely as relative to shipping.68 
 
While Globalisation can of course be argued as being the main engine behind such 
shifts, the role that the development of the maritime trade industry has had as a facilitator 
for that process cannot be understated. Maritime transport is essentially the only 
economically viable method for large-scale long distance trade, without which the effects 
of Globalisation would arguably have struggled to take hold. It is the maritime industry that 
has provided the tools for scaling seemingly insurmountable obstacles to trade and without 
it other products provided by other creations of Globalisation, such as the internet and 
global financial networks, would be pointless in the absence of the cost-effective transport 
                                                          
67 Tangredi, 2002: XXV 
68 Amirell: 2012: 1 
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provided across the world’s oceans.69 While credit for the birth of globalisation often goes 
largely to industrialisation and technical development, it is the maritime domain that has 
acted as the constant facilitator.70 
 
Speaking at the 2010 Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the UK 
House of Lords representative, Lord Michael Jopling, summed up in a nutshell the extent to 
which the globalised world now relies on the sea. 
 
“Seventy percent of the surface of the Earth is covered by water, 90% of global 
trade and about half of the world’s oil are transported by sea. Maritime areas also 
provide a vital dimension of Europe’s economy. It is estimated that 90% of the 
European Union (EU)’s external trade and 40% of internal trade is transported by 
sea.” (Jopling, 2010) 
 
The influence of Globalisation on the modern maritime industry is undisputable, but 
that is not to say that the Globalisation of the oceans only occurred in recent times. 
Looking back through history, it becomes apparent that maritime security is something 
which has featured on the agenda since the very beginning of European expansion.71 With 
booming trade with outposts overseas fuelling the rise of the seafaring nation, attention 
inevitably turned to the detail of who was actually in control of vast and apparently 
unclaimed regions of ocean, as well as how to protect maritime activity far from home. Off 
from this early ‘Globalisation’ of the maritime domain spun initial studies and definitions of 
maritime security (see figure 1.7), such as Papal Bulls in the mid-15th century recognising 
the roles of Spain and Portugal as the dominant maritime powers (a period largely defined 
by a philosophy of Mare Clausum). The increasing importance of trading companies as the 
centuries progressed, most notably in the case of the Dutch and British empires, saw this 
monopoly reversed (a period largely defined by a philosophy of Mare Liberum), as a more 
                                                          
69 Tangredi, 2002: XXVI  
70 Tangredi, 2002b: 1 
71 Heine and Thakur, 2011: 2 
Page | 30 
 
pragmatic approach took root when it came to protecting maritime trade. In line with the 
immense importance of trading companies to state interests came technological 
developments in the maritime field, which effectively provided the tools through which 
navies could police vast swathes of ocean. The build-up to the major conflicts of the 20th 
century saw naval power reach a peak in terms of the sheer quantity of vessels deployed, 
before the end of the Cold War and an increasingly unlikeliness of open naval warfare 
hailed the start of a notable decline in the number of vessels maintained. Mirroring this 
decline is an increase in the role played by private security companies, in what is arguably a 
return to the Mare Liberum model in which trading companies were largely responsible for 
their own security while traversing far off oceans. 
 
Figure 1.7 Approaches to maritime security throughout history 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
 
Curiously, the current state of Globalisation may actually see us witness the regress 
of the principle of Mare Clausum. As the world presses ahead with the imposition of ever-
growing claims and regulations regarding extended continental shelves, what we may be 
about to witness is the creation of some form of EEZ which extends out to 200 nautical 
miles and beyond.72 Although the current international approach to the issue does not 
affect the legal status of the water or airspace above a claimed continental shelf,73 such a 
                                                          
72 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982: Article 76 provides the definition as to the extent 
of continental shelves. 
73 United Nations Environment Programme, 2009: 8 
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situation may result in an unintended policing or strangulation of areas once thought to be 
governed by the principle of Mare Liberum.74 
 
Regardless of how links to economic issues and age-old principles shape the future 
of maritime security, the development of interlinked global trade and communication 
shows no signs of letting up and is only likely to increase as more and more nations begin 
to build infrastructures and societies which rely on resources imported via sea routes (see 
figure 1.8). 
 
To such an extent does the modern world rely on the shipping industry, an average 
of 1.2 tons of cargo are shipped annually per person.75 The vast amounts of commodities 
involved saw a world fleet of 104,304 sea-going merchant ships (weight of >100 gross tons) 
traversed the high seas in 2011.76 
 
Figure 1.8: Global maritime trade 
 
Source: adapted from UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2011: 7 
                                                          
74 For example, heightened levels of tension in the South China Sea are fuelled by ongoing disputes over the 
sovereignty of islands claimed by several states in the region. 
75 Stopford, 2010: 2 
76 International Maritime Organisation, 2012b: 8 
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While the benefits are obvious, Globalisation-fuelled technological development in 
the maritime field has further compounded on security risks, with modern tankers and 
container ships now bigger than ever77 and, as a result, presenting a more 
attractive/lucrative target non-traditional actors.78 Curiously, the marked increase in the 
size and quantity of merchant vessels has not been matched by the world’s navies. On the 
contrary, resources have been shifted away from traditional maritime assets to such an 
extent that the US Navy, which itself has been going through a very measurable 
downsizing, is currently the only force worthy of consideration as a global navy79 at a time 
when the world is almost desperately reliant on the stability of the maritime domain. 
Should Mahan’s traditional argument that sea power, vis-à-vis the ability to enforce policy 
in the field of maritime security, is solely about the ability to wage naval warfare remain as 
navies’ raison d'etat, then a decrease in the number of vessels deployed would indicate a 
shift in approach to maritime security. However, this is perhaps to be expected as a result 
of the effects of Globalisation on trade and technology. Although a tool capable of dictating 
the location, timing and procedure of maritime activity, on top of their ability to control 
access to regions,80 no longer are navies required for the manipulation of world trade. 
While they are still effective tools for deterrence, diplomacy and political influence, trade 
rather than the cannon is fast becoming the weapon of choice for the world’s major 
players. To this end, the shipping industry and the ability to exploit maritime resources are 
now what should be looked at as a scale for measuring modern sea power.81 
 
However, that is not to say that traditional naval forces have lost their application 
and we may indeed be on the cusp of a return to the fielding of large naval fleets as 
economic and diplomatic tools. Of particular relevance here is the rise of China and the 
importance that has been attached to an American military presence in maintaining trade 
                                                          
77 The world’s largest ore carriers, used largely to transport iron ore from Brazil to Europe and Asia, have an 
estimated deadweight of 400,000 tons.  
78 Lal et al., 2006 notes that the attack on the oil tanker Limburg in October 2002 was seen as the cause of a 
short-term collapse in shipping in the area, with notable economic consequences for the region’s states. 
79 Tangredi, 2002b: 2 
80 Tangredi, 2002b: 6 
81 ibid: 4 
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in the Far East.82 While the potential flash point of Taiwan appears to have moved to the 
back burner in recent times, on-going issues in the Pacific theatre and huge levels of US 
and Chinese investment in naval tools in the region83 are perhaps a sign that the traditional 
maritime security issues and strategies are yet to see their heyday. 
  
Considering the dependence that many of the world’s nations now have on the 
Globalised economy, it necessarily follows that the process of Globalisation will itself 
feature heavily as a potential existential threat in its own right in the field of economic 
security. A prime example can be seen present-day in the form of the ongoing debt crisis, 
which has undoubtedly shook the very foundations of the globally intertwined financial 
system.84 
 
However, that is not to say that Globalisation is limited exclusively to the economic 
security vector. The bread and butter of the phenomenon may be traced to efforts to 
produce an explanation for greater levels of transnational economic activity, finance and 
investment, but that same phenomenon also lends itself to the description of ever-
increasing technological integration, the propagation of ideas, the movement of people 
and cultural exchanges.85 To this end, Globalisation will necessarily begin to taken on a 
more prominent manifestation in the fields of military, environmental, political and societal 
security as the 21st century progresses. After all, Globalisation is an ongoing exponential 
process, rather than a process fixed in time and space.86 
 
                                                          
82 U.S. Department of Defense, 2012: 2 affirms: “Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to 
contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region…The 
maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce, and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will 
depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence.” 
83 BBC, 2012 highlights that around 60% of the US fleet will be deployed to the Pacific region by 2020, in what 
is a clear indication of the continued relevance of traditional naval forces. 
84 The applicability of the Copenhagen School’s approach is evident here, with examples of speech acts and 
the resulting process of securitisation readily available in the form of extraordinary austerity measures taken 
by national governments and encouraged by supranational entities. 
85 Heine and Thakur, 2011: 2 
86 Robertson, 1992: 59 
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Although the influence that Globalisation has had on the global economy and the 
benefits reaped the world over are incontrovertible, what has essentially been painted 
over is the more sinister side of the phenomenon. The security perils of an inextricably 
interlinked world were largely ignored as geo-economics seemed to claim the day with the 
promise of endless growth. The events of the 11th of September 2001 were what drew back 
the curtain in one swoop, transforming Globalisation into a theme that would now feature 
on the security agenda.87 A small and apparently irrelevant security concern from far afield 
had managed to use the transport and technology provided by the process of Globalisation 
in what could be argued as an anti-Globalisation attack.88 
 
While the maritime domain my seem like a far cry away from Ground Zero, the 
attack at the heart of a global commerce centre saw the US government almost 
completely, at least in the short term, alter the focus of its maritime assets.89 Wholesale 
policy changes to maritime security approaches have also been made around the world as 
a result of the 9/11 attacks, with various supranational organisations (for example, the 
WCO’s Framework of Standards, the International Cargo Security Council, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, the Container Security Initiative and the IMO’s International Ship and 
Facility Security programme) and nation states scrambling to bolster port security in light of 
what was now viewed as a security vulnerability.90 
 
Despite these developments, the 9/11 attacks did arguably have a reinforcing effect 
on one of the more traditional roles of maritime forces; namely to support land-based 
activity. Facing wholesale changes in light of spending reductions being implemented by 
the Bush administration at the turn of the century, the need for an immediate presence in 
                                                          
87 Tangredi, 2002: XXVII 
88 Streusand, 2002: 29 affirms: “Arguably, Osama bin Laden’s war is against the effects of globalization rather 
than any deliberate Western policy.” 
89 For example, see Boyd, 2002: “The week before the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks… the Coast Guard cutter 
Tahoma was cruising the peaceful waters off New England, protecting codfish and scallops from illegal 
fishermen. A week later, the 270-foot vessel was patrolling New York harbor, machine guns ready, warily 
shepherding foreign ships into port.” 
90 Khalid, 2005 
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the Middle East was addressed by the US Navy; particularly through its ability to deploy 
carrier groups to the region in a ground support role.91 
 
What the 9/11 attacks essentially brought home was a realisation that security was 
no longer a field limited to traditional threats, but was now becoming increasingly 
concerned with addressing asymmetric threats.92 Not only has the translucent state of 21st 
century borders opened up opportunities for financial gain and the further development of 
‘civil’ society, it has equally done the same for ‘uncivil’/non-traditional transnational 
actors.93 
 
“In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the free flow of information, 
people, goods and services has accelerated at an unprecedented rate. This 
interconnection has empowered individuals for good and ill, and challenged state 
based international institutions that were largely designed in the wake of World 
War II by policymakers who had different challenges in mind. Non-state actors can 
have a dramatic influence on the world around them.” (US National Security 
Strategy, 2010: 7) 
 
Not only does Globalisation make actors more vulnerable to security threats 
beyond their own borders through failures of the complex systems which they depend on, 
but it also provides additional access and means which can be exploited to disrupt 
globalised networks.94 This is no more apparent than in the constantly shifting field of 
maritime security. 
 
Of all the effects which Globalisation has had on the current maritime security 
portrait, it is perhaps the development of non-traditional security threats that has 
                                                          
91 Gaffney, 2009: 540 
92 National Security Strategy, 2010: 15 outlines the strengthening of the US military in order to prepare a wide 
range of contingencies against non-state actors. Seen as somewhat of a break from traditional US strategy, 
the document has been largely touted as the definitive guide for US foreign policy in the coming years. 
93 Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 231 
94 Navari, 2013: 39 
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triggered the largest shift. These threats have of course existed throughout history, but it is 
Globalisation that has massively contributed to their reach and extent.95 Clear examples 
can see seen in maritime security issues specifically present in this research paper’s 
geographical area of study. 
 
The effects of Globalisation on the world’s maritime routes has, without a doubt, 
been the main facilitator of transnational drug trafficking. While the illegal trade in 
narcotics is estimated to be the world’s second largest industry,96 drug producing regions 
are often far afield from destination markets, giving maritime routes a fundamental role. 
While cocaine production is dominated by three counties in Latin America, the world’s two 
most profitable cocaine markets (the US and Europe) are overseas. A total of 106 tons of 
cocaine were seized in the United States, while a total of 71 tons were seized in Europe97 in 
2011; most of which will had been transported by sea in what is clearly an issue of 
maritime security. The maritime trafficking of hashish originating from North Africa is also 
becoming an increasingly predominant issue in the Mediterranean in the fallout of the 
Arab Spring phenomenon, with regional instability transforming the region into a 
coordinator for illicit smuggling. 
 
Figure 1.9: Global maritime drug trafficking routes 
 
Source: adapted (base map) from Screen Avenue, 2013 
                                                          
95 Thachuk and Tangredi, 2009: 58 
96 Ibid: 57 
97 UNODC, 2014: 35-36 
Page | 37 
 
Recently a series of multi-ton maritime seizures have highlighted the extend of the 
issue and its potential connection with arms trafficking and terrorist activity in the region, 
in what is a clear example of a national security threat resulting from a non-traditional 
maritime threat.98 
 
Unstable conditions on land have also led to a considerable jump in the number of 
reported incidents of maritime piracy during the first two decades of the 21st century. With 
attackers taking advantage of nearby busy sea lanes, piracy is particularly prominent in the 
Gulf of Guinea, A total of 297 incidents of piracy were reported in 2012: 75 of which were 
off Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden; 58 in the Gulf of Guinea; and 81 incidents in the 
Indonesian archipelago.99 All three of these areas are fundamentally important maritime 
choke points and act as transit regions for vast amounts of energy supplies and goods. 
 
Figure 1.10: Global maritime piracy hotspots 
 
Source: adapted (base map) from Screen Avenue, 2013 
 
Likewise, large-scale human maritime trafficking is becoming more of an issue as 
the 21st century progresses. Incidents of mass clandestine immigration are becoming an 
increasing problem for Australia and the United States, while the European Union is 
currently investing vast amounts of maritime resources into policing its southern maritime 
border. In 2012, a total of 37,214 illegal border crossings were detected in the Eastern 
                                                          
98 Reuters, 2013 
99 ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2014: 5 
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Mediterranean, 10,379 in the Central Mediterranean and 6,379 in the Western 
Mediterranean.100 
 
Figure 1.11: Global maritime clandestine immigration routes 
 
Source: adapted (base map) from Screen Avenue, 2013 
 
To better tackle these new asymmetric threats, states are increasingly adapting not 
only their legislative tools, but also the capabilities of their actual naval assets. Examples 
include the Royal Netherlands Navy’s recent launch of the Holland Class off-shore patrol 
vessel. Developed as the new highlight of the Royal Netherlands Navy, the vessels are 
designed specifically for anti-piracy, anti-drug trafficking and quick response missions and 
are not actually capable of performing a role as a traditional naval combat platform.101 The 
French Navy has also followed suit with the Gowind Class, designed specifically for 
maritime safety and security missions,102 while the US Coast Guard continues to develop 
the Sentinel Class of vessels while will be used in anti-narcotics missions.103 
 
On the political level there are also signs of a shift in maritime security approaches 
in reaction to non-traditional threats, most notably relative what can generally be referred 
to as the principle of posse comitatus.104 Traditionally, many states have proven keen to 
                                                          
100 FRONTEX, 2013: 20 
101 Naval Technology, 2014 
102 MSHIPCO, 2012 
103 United States Coast Guard, 2013 
104 The principle is enshrined in the United States federal law 18 U.S.C. § 1385, more commonly known as the 
Posse Comitatus Act and is essentially the limiting of military forces in law enforcement activities. 
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maintain a clear separation between military tools and law enforcement activities, 
however several states have adopted legislation to better equip their forces for the tackling 
of non-traditional maritime threats. Maritime assets operating far afield are often 
presented with the conundrum of what to actually do when confronted with what are 
more situations of a legal nature, rather than of a defence nature. Naval assets deployed 
far afield are well-positioned to address maritime drug trafficking in sensitive regions, but 
lack the legal basis to act as law enforcement entities.105 To address this issue, many 
governments have passed legislation authorising the use of Law Enforcement Detachments 
(LEDET), in what is useful tool for actually addressing the globalised threat of maritime drug 
trafficking without encroaching on the limited of the Posse Comitatus principle.106 
 
In summary, the effects of Globalisation on maritime security are still open to 
debate. Many of the maritime challenges now emerging onto the security scene are 
relative new and, therefore, are still likely to develop. Just how far issues such as drug and 
weapon smuggling, human trafficking and piracy are likely to spread is of course hugely 
dependent on the situation in the regions in which such phenomena can be found. 
However, what is clear is that non-traditional threats have already began to shape 
approaches to maritime security. The design and deployment of maritime assets is being 
adapted to fit these new challenges, while the shipping industry is also taking steps to 
protect itself. 
 
Globalisation has had an undisputable influence on the field of maritime security, 
however it has not made the field irrelevant. On the contrary, maritime security will 
inevitably be more of an issue in a globalising world that relies more and more on maritime 
transport. What Globalisation has done to maritime security is force it to adapt to a world 
that now presents very different challenges in both nature and extent. 
                                                          
105 This is not the case for all navies. While it remains the case, for example, for the US Navy (it is the US Coast 
Guard which has a law enforcement role), the UK Royal Navy and the Armada Española, the Commanders of 
French Navy vessels are empowered to act as law enforcement officials. The Netherlands have also recently 
adopted their national legislation to grant such powers to the Royal Netherlands Navy. 
106 Shelton, 2014 
Page | 40 
 
 
2. The Gulf of Guinea and the Maritime Domain 
2.1 Regional Maritime Issues 
 
“Maritime security is essential to maintaining the flow of revenues from oil and gas, 
which have the potential to contribute significantly to development in the region. At 
the same time maritime resources such as fish, aquaculture and intact ecosystems 
directly contribute to the livelihoods of many Africans.” (Chatham House, 2013: 1) 
 
The Gulf of Guinea107 is a hugely diverse region. Home to more than an estimated 400 
million people,108 it is a thriving example of cultural and linguistic diversity and history. 
However, the region also attracts its fair share of negative attention. While 6%109 of the 
world’s population lives in the region, it generates just 1.2% of global GDP.110 Of the 17 
states included in this research paper’s definition of the Gulf of Guinea, 14 feature in the 
poorest 100 states out of a sample of 191.111 Further compounding on these unenviable 
levels of poverty is the fact that almost one third of states in the wider West African region 
have experienced a coup d’état in the last 5 years,112 in what is a sure indication of levels of 
political fragility right across the board. 
 
Such instability and economic under-development has led to startlingly high 
perceptions of corruption within the region’s states: corruption and a fragility of the state 
apparatus which is arguably gripping not only the Gulf of Guinea, but the entire African 
continent. 
                                                          
107 For the purposes of this paper, the Gulf of Guinea is defined as the area of the Eastern Atlantic Ocean from 
15°0’0”N to 15°0’0”S, thereby including the 17 states in the region that have a maritime border, namely: 
Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Togo. 
108 Calculated based on figures provided in CIA, 2014. 
109 Ibid 
110 Calculated based on figured provided in World Bank, 2014a. 
111 Ibid 
112 UNODC, 2013: 7 
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“Africa, on the other hand, home to 36 of the 50 least developed states, is in many 
ways a paradigm of how state weakness opens the door to transnational crime 
and terrorism.” (Heine and Thakur, 2011: 8) 
 
Indeed, with the exception of Senegal, Liberia, Ghana and Benin, none of the states 
included in this research paper’s sample feature in the top 100 states in terms of 
perceptions of corruption out of a total of 177 (the state ranked in 1st being that which is 
perceived as least corrupt).113 Nigeria offers a shocking example of such levels of ingrained 
corruption, with somewhere in the region of 90% of international aid received by the 
country since its independence in 1960 having been channelled away by corruption.114 
 
Table 2.1: overview of research sample states 
Country Population115 
GDP Rank 
(sample of 191)116 
Corruption Rank 
(sample of 177)117 
Failed State Index Rank 
(Sample of 178)118 
Angola 19.088.106 60 153 43 
Benin 10.160.556 140 94 78 
Cameroon 23.130.708 99 144 27 
Congo 4.662.446 122 154 36 
DR Congo 77.433.744 96 154 2 
Equatorial Guinea 722.254 114 163 47 
Gabon 1.672.597 108 106 99 
Gambia, The 1.925.527 176 127 62 
Ghana 25.758.108 81 63 110 
Guinea 11.474.383 147 150 14 
Guinea-Bissau 1.693.398 177 163 15 
Ivory Coast 22.848.945 95 136 12 
Liberia 4.092.310 165 83 23 
Nigeria 177.155.754 23 144 16 
Senegal 13.635.927 118 77 64 
Sierra Leone 5.743.725 151 119 33 
Togo 7.351.374 153 123 42 
                                                          
113 Transparency International, 2013 
114 Deculdt, 2013 
115 CIA, 2014 
116 World Bank, 2014a 
117 Transparency International, 2013 
118 The Fund for Peace, 2013 
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The indicators for the region are troubling, but it is the consequences of such 
instability that attract the attention of the wider community. Issues on land have spilled 
out into the Gulf of Guinea itself, fuelling maritime concerns that are showing few signs of 
improvement half way through the second decade of the 21st century. Evidence of many 
major maritime security issues (human trafficking, arms trafficking, drug trafficking and 
piracy) can all be found in the region, but it is piracy and drug trafficking which are the 
most startlingly evident and, consequently, it is these issues which are the focus of this 
research paper. 
 
While such a stifling level of corruption is in itself draining on the region’s political, 
economic and social outlooks, there are other issues which are becoming increasingly 
imbedded: issues which are of concern for the international community. One of the most 
pressing of those issues is piracy. Seen as phenomenon largely facilitated by widespread 
corruption and governance issues in the region, as well as the region’s states’ inability to 
maintain complete and full control of their territory, the Gulf of Guinea is now holder of 
the unenviable title as the world’s second most exposed region to piracy incidents.119 
Pressure elsewhere, particularly imposed by Operation Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, 
has reduced piracy in other areas and contributed to the Gulf of Guinea’s relative rise in 
the piracy league table, but trends do suggest that the problem is on the increase in the 
region. Just under 30% of recorded incidents in African waters from 2003 to 2011 (427 out 
of 1,434)120 occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, while incidents in the area rose by 73% from 
2010 to 2011.121 
 
“The Gulf of Guinea is, in many ways, a perfect incubator for piracy, providing both 
resources and safe haven. Surrounded by some of Africa’s most proficient oil 
producers, including Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, Ghana, and Equatorial Guinea, the 
                                                          
119 See IMO, 2013 for a full list of reported maritime piracy incidents occurring in 2012. 
120 Chatham House, 2013: 1 
121 From 39 incidents in 2010 to 53 incidents in 2011. 
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Gulf is a major transit route for oil tankers on their way to international markets. 
These tankers have proven valuable prey for pirates.” (Nelson, 2012) 
 
While the dangers to shipping passing through the area are obvious, the 
consequences risk triggering a downward spiral. As levels of attacks, or at least documents 
attacks, increase, shipping companies are likely to be faced by increasing costs for shipping 
in the region. As a result, foreign investment could be dissuaded, compounding on an 
already alarming political and economic situation which fosters conditions for illicit 
maritime activities.122 
 
Compounding on increasing incidents of piracy is an incapacity of the region’s states 
to effectively respond to the issue. The maritime domain is one that is not only difficult, but 
also expensive to police. The only real solution for the immediate prevention of piracy 
(save the long-term resolution of the economic and social issues that lead to and facilitate 
piracy) is heavily resource-dependent maritime patrols,123 which are well beyond the 
means of most of the region’s actors. Essentially, maritime security is a low priority issue 
for most Gulf of Guinea states. This may however change in the future, with the region 
spread of Nigerian-based piracy groups already having seen the Ivory Coast124 and 
Cameroon125 bolster their naval forces. Faced by a scarcity of resources, the region’s naval 
forces have also concentrated their efforts with the intention of creating safe areas in the 
piracy-plagued anchorages off Cotonou, Lomé and Lagos.126 However, it continues to be 
the case that only Nigeria and, to a degree, Angola can muster a naval response capable of 
acting as an effective deterrence or response to piracy activity in the area.127 
 
                                                          
122 Decludt, 2013 
123 Thachuk and Tangredi, 2002: 68 
124 Reuters, 2014. Ivory Coast has added around 40 new vessels to its fleet. “They will fight piracy, infiltration 
and illicit trafficking and will be managed by the navy”, the country’s Defence Minister was quoted as saying 
regarding the acquisition of the vessels. 
125 Defence Web, 2013. The Cameroon Navy acquired two Spanish-built patrol vessels, as well as a landing 
craft. 
126 United States Naval Institute News, 2014 
127 Ukeje and Movomo Lea, 2013: 10 
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Another unique and highly worrying phenomenon of Gulf of Guinea piracy is its 
violent aspect. While piracy in other regions tends to focus on capturing crew members to 
be used as leverage, that is not usually the case in the Gulf of Guinea. With the aim of 
attacks being steal goods, incidents have increasingly seen the use of firearms and violence 
against crews, which is less often the case in regions.128 
 
Table 2.2: Violence and use of firearms in Gulf of Guinea piracy incidents 
 
 
2013 2012 2011 
 
Threat of 
violence 
against 
crew 
Actual 
violence 
against 
crew 
Firearm 
used by 
attacker(s) 
Threat of 
violence 
against 
crew 
Actual 
violence 
against 
crew 
Firearm 
used by 
attacker(s) 
Threat of 
violence 
against 
crew 
Actual 
violence 
against 
crew 
Firearm 
used by 
attacker(s) 
Arabian Sea 2 
   
3 4 
 
1 2 
China Sea - - - - - - 
   
East Africa 2 1 1 3 1 2 6 8 3 
Far East - - - 1 
  
- - - 
Indian Ocean 22 4 1 7 4 1 6 1 
 
Malacca Strait 10 1 1 7 5 
 
9 2 2 
Mediterranean 
Sea 
7 
  
1 
  
1 
  
North Atlantic 
Ocean 
- - - 1 
 
1 
   
South America 
(Atlantic)  
1 1 
   
2 3 
 
South America 
(Central) 
4 2 1 3 1 
 
1 
  
South America 
(Panama) 
6 1 1 3 
 
3 4 1 2 
South China 
Sea 
87 20 10 34 20 7 35 11 5 
West Africa 11 11 14 10 13 19 7 15 9 
 
Source: IMO, 2011; IMO, 2012; IMO, 2013 
 
The Gulf of Guinea is of course not the only piracy hot spot threatening important 
shipping routes, however the motivation fuelling the occurrence of such incidents is 
unique. Piracy attacks on the East African seaboard tend to focus on the hijacking of ships 
                                                          
128 Neptune Maritime Security, 2012 notes that at least 20 of the 32 incidents reported in 2012 involved the 
use of a firearm. 
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and the taking of crews as hostages in order to press for the payments of ransoms, 
however the Gulf of Guinea presents a very different problem set. Many of the incidents 
recorded indicate that piracy in the region is more focused on stealing goods; more 
specifically the fuels being produced and shipped by the booming oil industry. This form of 
piracy has become such a serious issue that regional actors are becoming more concerned 
by hikes in trade-related costs and insurance rather than the occasional loss of cargo, as 
such increases risk having a hugely detrimental effect on the region’s entire economy.129 
 
While two thirds of Gulf of Guinea piracy incidents have occurred off the coast of 
Nigeria, it is largely believed that most of the perpetrators involved in such incidents are 
indeed based out of Nigeria.130 This is a reflection of the extent and impunity in which 
these ‘pirates’ operate. While incidents are focused around the densely populated Niger 
Delta region, there have been reports as far afield as Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana and 
Togo.131 Another indicator this impunity is the modi operanti used. Despite appearances, 
there is evidence to suggest that the perpetrators of such incidents have the liberty to be 
selective in their targeting of vessels; often making extensive voyages and working based 
on prior knowledge of cargo and shipping routes, before selecting the most lucrative 
target.132 
 
Figure 2.3: Gulf of Guinea Piracy hotspots 2006-2012 
 
Source: adapted from figures presented in Think Africa Press, 2013 
                                                          
129 Bem-Ari, 2013: 12 
130 Think Africa Press, 2013 
131 Ben-Ari, 2013: 12 
132 United States Naval Institute News, 2014 
Page | 46 
 
As Globalisation brings the world closer together than ever before and 
technological advancement sees flows of information and commerce circulate the globe at 
ever increasing speeds, parts of the world in which particular global risks may have seemed 
completely alien are now facing the new realities of threats that are finding it ever easier to 
cross international boundaries. One such challenge posed to the Gulf of Guinea is what the 
2013 Global Risks Report defines as Widespread Illicit Trade;133 more specifically the 
challenge posed by the trafficking of illicit drugs into/through the area.134 
 
With the turn of the millennia seeing the lucrative European market up the policing 
of its waters against illicit trafficking, the Gulf of Guinea quickly developed into a hub 
through which the international trade in illicit narcotics, particularly cocaine, operates. 
Although essentially produced exclusively in three Latin American countries, increasingly 
notable seizure figures indicate that the area has fallen prey to international organised 
crime using the region as a transit point between South America and Europe. This use is 
further encouraged by the notoriously high prices of cocaine on the European market, with 
the drug selling at all-time high prices that are 60% higher than in the US market.135 
 
Curiously, while trafficking through the Gulf of Guinea is believed to be an 
increasingly more commonplace activity, the region is little more than a transit point for 
illicit material destined for other markets, as noted above. Indeed, transits points between 
Latin America and Europe such as Cape Verde are not generally considered as being areas 
with their own drug usage problems.136 However, recent studies have suggested that 
addition rates are on the rise as a consequence trafficking through the region.137 
 
Much of the focus of cocaine transportation from Latin America into West Africa is 
around the latitude of 10 degrees north (directly across the Atlantic Ocean into the Gulf of 
                                                          
133 World Economic Forum, 2013 
134 The African Executive, 2009 notes that an estimated 27% of the cocaine consumed annually in Europe is 
believed to pass through the Gulf of Guinea. 
135 Mutume, 2007: 3 
136 AFRICOM, 2010 
137 Deutche Welle, 2013 
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Guinea), which is the shortest distance between the two continents. In light of the notable 
use of that latitude, European law enforcement agencies have come to know the route as 
‘highway 10’.138 
 
The issue and severity of highway 10 really came to light between 2004 and 2007, 
when a series of major maritime cocaine seizures were made in the Gulf of Guinea 
region.139 Shockingly, the sheer quantity of narcotics being moved through the region was 
estimated to be worth more than the annual GDP of some of the states being used as 
transit zones.140 While such large scale narcotics trafficking is of course facilitated by issues 
of governance, there is also a major concern that foreign trafficking groups abusing and 
already fragile Gulf of Guinea will trigger even higher levels of corruption and even political 
violence.141 
 
“The fragile States of West Africa are not in a position to take on Latin American 
organised crime gangs, which are much stronger in terms of resources. The 
establishment of the illegal drug market in those weak States goes hand in hand 
with a rise in instability, growing levels of corruption, possible financing of non‐
governmental armed groups and high incidence of cocaine use.” (Brombacher and 
Maihold, 2009: 1) 
 
Such fears appear to have been proven as founded, with a series of incidents across 
the region indicating dangerous levels of corruption at some of the highest levels of 
government: Guinean officials have been accused of using diplomatic channels to move 
cocaine across borders;142 in 2010 the Gambian president dismissed the national head of 
the police, the head of the navy, the deputy head of the army and even the head of the 
                                                          
138 UNODC, 2007b: 6 
139 The amount of cocaine trafficked via West Africa is believes to have increased from just 3 tons in 2004 to 
around 47 tons in 2007 (UNODC, 2011: 26) 
140 UNODC, 2013: 9 
141 Mcguire, 2010: 1 
142 African Executive, 2009 
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National Drug Enforcement Agency for involvement in narcotics trafficking143; and in 2008 
Sierra Leone’s Minister of Transportation was forced to resign after his cousin was 
associated with an aircraft used to transport a notable quantity of cocaine.144 All of this 
without mentioning the dire state of Guinea (Conakry) and Guinea-Bissau. 
 
It should however be stressed that drug trafficking, while worryingly prevalent in 
the Gulf of Guinea, is not the sole, or even initial, cause of the governance issues being 
experienced in the region today. While it unarguably contributes to a worsening of the 
situation, it is essentially a consequence of wider patterns of drug consumption (i.e. 
trafficking as the result of demand on the European market) and the perceived ease of 
operating in the area. Many of the region’s states are struggling under the weight of huge 
deficits, while global indexes and rankings only contribute to the perception of an area 
considered as lacking in terms of rule of law and open and transparent governance.145 
 
“The sudden rise in cocaine trafficking through West Africa indisputably has 
negative implications for governance, security, and development in the region. It 
is, however, crucial to recognize that cocaine trafficking is not a cause of state 
fragility and political corruption but is rather a symptom of the pre-existence of 
these conditions in West Africa.” (Mcguire, 2009: 3) 
 
Widespread corruption, high levels of poverty and an absence of an effective state 
apparatus to control such activity sees the Gulf of Guinea occupy a position of preference 
for drug trafficking organisations. Notoriously low levels of development arguably make 
certain West African states attractive areas for use as transit points for illicit materials and 
with 14 of the 15 ECOWAS states all falling within the bottom 50 (with the exception of 
Cape Verde, in 132nd) ranked in the 2012 Human Development Index,146 many of the 
                                                          
143 Independent Online, 2010 
144 The Guardian, 2010 
145 Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013: 10 
146 United Nations Development Programme, 2013: 146 
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region’s actors would find it difficult to muster the resources needed to effectively prevent 
usage of the region as a transit route by drug trafficking groups. 
 
Figure 2.4: West Africa maritime cocaine seizures 2005-2011 
 
Source: UNODC, 2013: 10 
 
2.2 Maritime insecurity and the failed state phenomenon 
 
Unenviably high levels of corruption,147 some of the world’s highest illiteracy rates,148 
porous international borders and systematic failures in overall governance plague the Gulf 
                                                          
147 Transparency International, 2013. With the exception of Ghana, all of the countries comprising this 
research paper’s definition of the Gulf of Guinea are in the top 100 of the Corruption Ranking. 
148 Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2009. A reported 40% of West Africa’s adult population cannot 
read or write. 
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of Guinea and contribute to what is perhaps a justified label of failed state149 to some the 
region’s nations. Essentially, what the idea of a failed state embodies is the notion of a 
weak state taken to the extreme. However, the assessment of the weakness of a state is a 
particularly problematic academic exercise, principally due to the varied methods for 
assessing the relative stability/weakness of states. Maintaining this research paper’s focus 
on the Copenhagen School approach, the concept of the ‘idea of the state’ is what is 
fundamental to the analysis of a state’s bill of health. To this end, a weak state (i.e. a failed 
state) is one in which the domestic consensus does not have the strength to eliminate the 
threats faced within that state.150 Deeply engrained corruption and proven involvement in 
illicit activities on the part of important state actors would certainly lend to indications of 
state weakness in the Gulf of Guinea region. 
 
Highly unstable economic outlooks and some of the world’s lowest GDP figures 
means that investment in security is often overlooked in the Gulf of Guinea and the field of 
maritime security is no exception. However, an absence of maritime security can bring with 
it catastrophic consequences, opening the door to illicit activities that can plunge already 
vulnerable states into a perpetual cycle: state weakness acts as a facilitator for issues which 
are essentially maritime in terms of method and application (i.e. large-scale drug trafficking 
and piracy), while the prevalence of these issues contributes to a further weakening of the 
state. While it is arguable that the absence of one step of this cycle could potentially bring 
it to a halt, what is certain is that instability facilitates trafficking, as trafficking facilitates 
instability. 
 
“Policy planners point out that organized crime can derail development 
programmes. In turn, unbalanced or inadequately planned development 
contributes to criminality, resulting in a vicious cycle of poverty-crime-poverty.” 
(Mutume, 2007: 3) 
                                                          
149 Global Policy Forum, 2014 notes a failed state as being a state which “can no longer perform basic 
functions such as education, security, or governance, usually due to fractious violence or extreme poverty.” 
150 Buzan, 1991: 67 
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On a side note, it is worth stating that the western-centred study of security 
(maritime security included) perhaps adds more of an emphasis to the extent of the failed 
state issue than it actually deserves. After all, a permanent state of stable security right 
across the board is something that is only really enjoyed by a small core of developed 
states. In short, around the world insecurity is by far more of a normal circumstance that 
security.151 
 
One of the most infamous examples of a perpetual cycle of insecurity, highly 
influenced by illicit maritime activity, is Guinea-Bissau. What Guinea-Bissau is experiencing 
is essentially a weak state insecurity dilemma, whereby the state has failed to convince its 
internal actors that armed rebellions and coups d’état are counter-productive,152 even 
reaching a point in which the actual security mechanisms of the state itself look to seize 
power to further their own interests.153 In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the furthering of 
interests on the part of certain groups can be largely be seen in the complacency with 
which the issue of maritime drug trafficking is addressed. One of the main complications 
here is that many, particularly the poorest, now rely on such activity for survival, making 
discouraging such complacency an extremely complicated task. 
 
Assuming then that Guinea-Bissau is experiencing an insecurity dilemma, it is 
curious to note that the country actually has one of the highest ratios of military personnel 
in the region, with only Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon having a higher ratio.154 Such 
a ratio would arguably be well equipped to deal with security challenges. However, such 
extensive coups d’état suggest that it is in fact this powerful domestic actor which is largely 
contributing to a lack of overall regime security (i.e. a situation in which governing actors 
are isolated from violent overthrow). Essentially then, the internal security challenges 
                                                          
151 Jackson, 2010: 186 
152 See BBC, 2014 for a comprehensive timeline of incidents which have affected Guinea-Bissau. Worryingly, 
Guinea-Bissau has changed government more times as a result of coups than as a result of elections. 
153 UNODC, 2011: 28: “Some observers have linked the murder of the President João Vieira in March 2009 
and the coup d’etat of the military in April 2010 to such conflicts that were, at least partly, financed out of 
drug trafficking.” 
154 Data compiled from Hackett, 2012. 
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inherited by Guinea-Bissau as a weak state contribute to a condition which makes it 
incapable of dealing with external threats such as maritime drug trafficking. 
 
“Guinea-Bissau is considered one of the poorest countries in the world, and is a 
primary transhipment point for drugs moving between South America and Europe. 
Military and law enforcement officials are purportedly deeply involved in the drug 
trade, so traffickers move with impunity throughout the country. This is the type 
of failed state that breeds regional instability.” (Grassley, 2012: 1) 
 
Branded as a ‘narco-state’, Guinea-Bissau is one of the poorest states in what is 
already a generally poor region.155 This of course goes someway to explaining the appeal of 
the international drug smuggling industry for the country: with cocaine trafficking 
estimated to be worth somewhere in the region of 2 billion USD to the country, which is 
almost double Guinea-Bissau’s actual GDP, there are clear economic implications to be 
taken into consideration.156 To put those implications into context: the national budget of 
Guinea-Bissau is worth roughly the same as two and a half tons of cocaine sold at 
wholesale on the European market.157 
 
While the finger is largely pointed at Guinea-Bissau as one of the world’s most 
infamous examples of the damage which can be caused by large-scale maritime drug 
trafficking, it is of course not the only state believed to act as a cocaine safe-haven. Indeed, 
Ghana, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and even the relatively stable countries 
of Senegal and Cape Verde have been associated as transits points for cocaine heading into 
the lucrative European market. 
 
There would also appear then to be other reasons which make Guinea-Bissau such 
an attractive location for drugs trafficking. Inevitably the weakness of the state outlined 
                                                          
155 In a region that claims just 1.20% of the world’s GDP, Guinea-Bissau is particularly worse off; with a GDP of 
just 859 million USD (World Bank, 2014a). 
156 Africa Economic Development Institute, 2014 
157 UNODC, 2007a: 12 
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above plays a part, but there are also other historical and cultural reasons to be taken into 
consideration. As a former Portuguese colony, Guinea-Bissau shares a common language 
and cultural ties with other Lusophone countries that form an important triangle for the 
importation of cocaine into Europe, namely Portugal on Europe’s Atlantic seaboard, Cape 
Verde on the Eastern side of the Atlantic and Brazil to the West. Moreover, Guinea-Bissau 
is highly accessible to maritime activity in being comprised of 87 islands (21 of which are 
largely uninhabited).158 
 
The influence of the well-documented chronic lack of resources in Guinea-Bissau 
also undoubtedly plays its part. One case in April 2007 was an ideal example of how an 
inability on the part of state actors to intervene in maritime security issues such as large-
scale drug trafficking often sees such crimes go unpunished. While an estimated 635kg of 
high-grade cocaine were seized by the authorities in Guinea-Bissau, an estimated 2500kg 
slipped away unhindered, due to the fact that the poorly-equipped law enforcement forces 
in the area did not have the resources to give chase.159 
 
2.3 Globalisation and the Gulf of Guinea: the importance of Maritime 
security 
 
Despite its noted deficiencies, the Gulf of Guinea is certainly a basket of economic 
potential; most notably in terms of its vast and largely untapped hydrocarbon reserves. 
Despite the emergence of the region an energy provider in its own right, it is curious to 
note that levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Gulf of Guinea have actually seen a 
slight decline in recent years. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
158 UNODC 2011: 28 
159 Mutume, 2007: 3 
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Table 2.5: Levels of foreign direct investment in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Foreign direct investment in USD 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Angola 2,205,298,180 -3,227,211,182 -3,023,770,966 -6,897,954,559 
Benin -18,732,014 53,454,933 161,091,309 158,589,231 
Cameroon 740,307,389 537,779,845 652,411,756 525,754,619 
Congo 1,861,554,557 2,210,884,010 3,055,952,325 2,757,934,448 
DR Congo -278,000,000 2,728,800,000 1,596,024,304 2,891,607,809 
Equatorial Guinea 1,636,219,625 2,734,000,000 1,975,000,000 2,115,073,208 
Gabon 573,000,000 499,000,000 696,000,000 702,406,408 
Gambia, The 39,447,344 37,366,208 36,178,721 33,524,809 
Ghana 2,372,540,000 2,527,350,000 3,222,240,000 3,294,520,000 
Guinea 140,850,000 101,350,000 956,040,000 605,400,000 
Guinea-Bissau -1,346,926 1,469,884 25,024,053 16,226,636 
Ivory Coast 396,030,774 358,118,909 286,110,464 478,400,216 
Liberia 127,803,425 452,342,328 1,312,748,380 1,354,100,000 
Nigeria 8,554,840,769 6,048,560,266 8,841,952,775 7,101,031,884 
Senegal 330,145,121 266,107,641 338,218,819 337,669,579 
Sierra Leone 110,430,203 238,404,158 950,477,689 548,073,515 
Togo 46,118,874 124,942,199 171,038,614 166,324,169 
 
Source: World Bank, 2014b. 
 
With “foreign direct investment seen as the primary motor of globalization”,160 it 
perhaps comes as a surprise that an area which is increasingly becoming a global energy 
supplier would see a decrease in FDI from 2011 to 2012 (11 of the 17 states comprising this 
research paper’s sample saw a decrease).161 This is a particularly curious shift, should it be 
highlighted that Gulf of Guinea states, particularly those sitting in the Niger Delta of rich oil 
reserves, are vital in the energy security outlook of some of the world’s major economies 
and FDI providers, including China, France, India, Russia, the UK and the USA.162 Despite 
this shift, some of the region’s states are still showing notable levels of sustained 
                                                          
160 World Trade Organisation, 1996 
161 The noted reduction in FDI in Angola may be due to increased levels of Angolan investment abroad, rather 
than an actual decrease in incoming FDI. 
162 Courson, 2009: 5 
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development (namely levels currently being experienced in Angola and Nigeria) and are 
transforming the Gulf of Guinea into a region that is beginning to make a name for itself as 
one of the world’s principal energy producing regions; fuelled further by the post 9/11 
policies of American and certain European actors geared around the diversification of 
energy resources and efforts to break dependence on the unstable and potentially hostile 
Middle East region.163 
 
“…some countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have been gaining increased importance 
in the global energy sector (the cases of Angola and Nigeria). In the West African 
energy basin, various countries have been gaining importance in the petroleum 
geopolitical arena thanks to discoveries of new reserves and the expansion of 
production. Standing out amongst those countries are Nigeria, Angola, the 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.”  (Mendes Leal, 2011: 27) 
 
This phenomenon may in the long run bring further development to the entire area 
should one of its major actors assume a position as a regional power, however it is 
currently Angola and Nigeria who are experiencing and getting the most out of biggest oil 
booms; producing 34% and 47% of the region’s total oil supply respectively.164 Despite this 
boom, even these two regional powerhouses still have some way to go before they are 
considered amongst the world’s top ranking economies, with Nigeria still having only the 
23rd best GDP,165 despite being the world’s 8th most populous nation166 and despite having 
derived oil revenues somewhere in the region of 52 billion USD in 2011.167 
 
While the oil industry has brought in much needed investment to one of the world’s 
poorest regions, it is precisely that same industry which has also produced one of the Gulf 
                                                          
163 Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013: 13. This policy of diversification has seen the Gulf of Guinea become a vital 
area for American national security interests, resulting the establishment of a dedicated and autonomous 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008. 
164 Chatham House, 2013: 1 
165 Calculated based on figured provided in World Bank, 2014a. 
166 CIA Factbook, 2014 
167 UNODC, 2013: 45 
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of Guinea’s increasingly problematic maritime security issues; more precisely piracy. The 
dark side of Globalisation provides for a black market in fuel both locally as well as 
regionally, which acts as a further incentive for piracy activity. 
 
“Much of the piracy that affects West Africa is a product of the disorder that 
surrounds the regional oil industry. A large share of the recent piracy attacks 
targeted vessels carrying petroleum products. These vessels are attacked because 
there is a booming black market for fuel in West Africa. Without this ready market, 
there would be little point in attacking these vessels. There are indications that oil 
may also be smuggled outside the region.” (UNODC, 2013: 45) 
 
The issue of piracy has become so damaging to the oil producing sector in the region 
that a staggering 7% of Nigeria’s oil wealth is believed to be lost due to the phenomenon.168 
While not all oil revenue losses can be attributed to this medium, it does play a fundamental 
role in the wider issues that result in an estimated loss of 400,000 barrels of oil per day in 
Nigeria, representing a cost of 1 billion USD per month169 in what is an ideal example of how 
one single threat can span across a range of security fields. Not only is the theft of oil 
damaging the economy, it is also a risk-ridden activity in terms of environmental security due 
to the potential for large-scale oil spills170 and has ramifications for political and societal 
security, with the OCGs involved in this illicit activity believed to even have replaced the state 
in some locations in the building of infrastructure as a method of swaying the loyalty of local 
populations.171 
 
                                                          
168 Nelson, 2012 
169 Chatham House, 2013: 12 
170 Mwalimu, 2009: 29: “Siphoning of fuel illegally due to thriving black markets for fuel products also 
contributes to oil pipeline explosions. In July 2000, a pipeline explosion immediately outside the city of Warri, 
Nigeria was responsible for the death of two hundred and fifty people. In December 2000, another explosion 
in the city of Lagos led to the death of sixty people. On May 16, 2008, BBC estimated that at least one 
hundred and up to two hundred people died in an oil pipeline explosion.” 
171 Chatham House, 2013: 12 
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Aside from the obvious issue of piracy, the field of maritime security also plays 
another fundamental role in region’s infrastructure for Globalisation; more precisely oil 
extraction and refinery facilities themselves. Again, the oil producing powerhouse of Nigeria 
is a solid example worthy of study, with approximately one third of production capacity 
located offshore.172 
 
Figure 2.6: Location of Gulf of Guinea energy reserves 
 
Source: Offshore Energy Today, 2013 
 
These facilities are of course part of the wider security spectrum of the Gulf of 
Guinea, meaning that they are vulnerable to the issues affecting the region. The two main 
threats to these installations in the Gulf of Guinea in particular which are either a direct 
maritime security issue or which could be prevented through the improvement of the 
maritime security setting are politically-motivated insurgency and, again, piracy. Of the 
estimated six piracy attacks against off shore facilities which have been reported globally 
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since 2007, four actually took place in the Gulf of Guinea.173 Relative to insurgency, the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attracts the biggest headlines. 
Initially associated with insurgency along rivers and the states located around the Niger 
Delta, offshore facilities were once thought to be largely out of range. However, the attack 
on the 20th of June 2008 on the largest single platform in the entire Niger Delta, the Bonga 
Oil Platform, located 120km off shore, demonstrated that this was no longer the case.174 In 
total, MEND was associated with at least 13 attacks on offshore oil and gas facilities in the 
region between 2006 and 2010 alone.175 
 
Another maritime security vulnerability in the Gulf of Guinea which is inextricably 
linked to Globalisation is the area’s geographical significance as a shipping route. Placed in 
a strategically and commercially important area on the East Atlantic seaboard, the region is 
the shortest distance for Atlantic crossings from South America and is a transit route for 
maritime traffic heading around the Southern Cape of Africa both to and from Europe, the 
Middle East and Asia. At the same time, conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East which 
are affecting the shorter Arab Gulf maritime route also encourage the increased usage of 
the Gulf of Guinea.176 Moreover, many of the region’s states rely on commerce generated 
from exporting materials via maritime routes, while vessels transiting through the region 
are an important source of tax revenue. With an estimated 30,000 ships transiting the Gulf 
of Guinea every year,177 any detrimental influence on shipping in the region is sure to have 
far-reaching consequences. 
 
Piracy can have a hugely damaging effect on trade flows and countries such as 
Benin have particularly suffered due to the resulting reluctance on the part of some 
                                                          
173 Journal of Energy Security, 2013 lists: 01/04/07 attack on Bulford Dolphin mobile offshore drilling rig; 
03/05/07 attack on FPSO (floating production, storage, and offloading vessel) Mystras; 05/05/07 attack on 
Trident VIII offshore rig; 05/01/10 attack on FSO Westaf. 
174 Courson, 2009: 23 
175 Journal of Energy Security, 2013 
176 Ukeje and Mvomo Ela, 2013: 9 
177 Nautilus International, 2014 
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shipping companies to make stops in the region. An estimated 70% drop in shipping activity 
due to the prevalence of piracy is hitting the country heavily, resulting in decreased 
revenue usually generated from taxing vessels using the port of Cotonou.178 As a country 
heavily dependent on trade taxes (an estimated 50% of state revenue is sourced from this 
medium), this decrease in activity has led to an estimated loss of 28% of tax revenue and 
threatens to have a wider knock-on effect on other sectors in the country. In fact, Benin 
has been so heavily affected by piracy that the country’s president has appealed to the 
United Nations to consider forming an anti-piracy initiative similar to that in place off 
Somalia.179 
 
2.4 Regional security complexes 
 
 “Ensuring the security of the Gulf of Guinea is beyond the capacity of any existing 
regional body acting alone. A number of regional organizations share an interest in 
maritime security…Geographical and mandate overlap argues for greater 
integration and coordination of maritime initiatives.” (Chatham House, 2013: 5) 
 
To try and nail down the specific causes of maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea is 
not a simple task. While issues such as piracy and illicit trafficking are increasingly well 
documented, the actual root causes of those issues are complex. There are many factors, 
both historical and contemporary, which contribute to the shape-shifting security 
environment in the region. There is of course the consideration of the Gulf of Guinea 
becoming an increasingly used, and as a result abused, route as a consequence of 
Globalisation and conflict elsewhere, but issues such as an increasing overreliance on oil 
revenue, the weakness of post-colonial state structures in West Africa, endemic 
governance and transparency problems, a lack of resources and investment in the 
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maritime sector and even the unclear definition of national maritime borders frame the 
Gulf of Guinea180 as a unique challenge for analysis. 
 
With the international community’s approach to the Gulf of Guinea essentially 
being different to that which can be found in loco and considering that many, if not all, of 
the maritime security topics in the region are transnational issues which can seldom be 
dealt with by individual states acting independently, there is space for another layer of 
analysis. 
 
“The system and the state levels of analysis tell us important thing about the 
national security problem…But there is also an important set of security dynamics 
at the regional level, and this often tends to get lost of discounted…Unless that 
level is properly comprehended, neither the position of the local states in relation 
to each other, nor the character of relations between the great powers and local 
states can be understood properly.” (Buzan, 2009: 158) 
 
Accepting that the influence of both national and international security agendas 
cannot be overlooked, the importance of a regional sub-system (‘sub’ in the sense that it is 
part of a greater/broader system i.e. the international system) of security also clearly has 
implications for how maritime security issues originate and are addressed in the Gulf of 
Guinea. International Security Studies is one academic vector which has particularly 
focused on the rising eminence of regional factors in defining the general security setting, 
with Africa and the ‘failed state’ phenomenon being included in the discussion as an 
example of the ‘if and when’ to intervene in local conflicts.181 While of course taking into 
consideration the fundamental role of the international community in this discourse, what 
must be highlighted here is that many of the maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea 
are regional in cause as well as effect. Essentially, security issues in the Gulf of Guinea must 
be examined from a regional perspective. 
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Thompson’s 1973 research into the nature of regional subsystems has become one 
of the topic’s corner stones of academic study.182 The framework provided certainly 
supports the argument in favour of consideration of the Gulf of Guinea in its own right, 
with the region satisfying most, if not all, of the attributes provided as a checklist for the 
consideration as a particular region as a regional subsystem.183 
 
Figure 2.7: Layers of security systems 
 
Source: adapted from the framework provided in Buzan, 2009: 158-188 
                                                          
182 See Thompson, 1973: 89-117 
183 See Thompson, 1973: 93 for the full list of attributes. These attributes include the geographical proximity 
of a region, the regularity of interactions, internal and external recognition as a distinctive area (i.e. “the Gulf 
of Guinea”), degrees of historical bonds, evidence of polices for further integration, explicit institutional 
subsystem organisation (i.e. the GGC) and a common developmental status.  
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By applying Buzan’s definition of a security complex,184 some of the nuances of Gulf 
of Guinea maritime security become more apparent. Although focusing more precisely on 
the security relationship between states themselves, the concept is clearly applicable to 
how groups of states address security issues. While Buzan does clearly make reference to 5 
security complexes in the third world,185 the porous nature of the region’s borders,186 the 
ethnic ties between its people, the transnational nature of the regions maritime security 
issues and the geographical proximity of states in the region187 make it an ideal candidate 
to be considered as its own regional security complex, particularly when dealing with issues 
of maritime security. 
 
Figure 2.8: Proposed Gulf of Guinea security complex 
 
Source: adapted from Buzan, 2009: 174 
                                                          
184 Buzan, 2009: 160: a security complex is defined as: “…a defined group of states whose primary security 
concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart 
from one another.” 
185 Ibid: 174 Latin (South) America, Middle East, Soutern Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia. 
186 The 2014 Ebola outbreak of the Ebola virus is a clear indication of the porous nature of the region’s 
borders, with the virus being transmitted on an unprecedented scale across national boundaries. 
187 Lake, 1997: 50 highlights the fundamental role of geography in defining regional subsystems, affirming 
that almost all of the attributes proposed by Thompson, 1973 are based upon geography. 
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 “Regional Security Complex is an analytical concept defined and applied by us, but 
these regions (RSCs) are socially constructed in the sense that they are contingent 
on the security practice of the actors. Dependent on what and whom they 
securitise, the region might reproduce or change.” (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 48) 
 
Lake’s research provides another analytical step in support of the consideration of 
the Gulf of Guinea as a regional security complex, namely in the verification of the 
importance of security externalities in defining RSCs.188 Maritime security is particularly 
relevant here, in that it is essentially the principal trans-border local security externality189 
affecting a set of states in the region. Although seen largely as a Nigerian generated 
problem,190 piracy does, as discussed in earlier sections, have a knock-on effect on the 
entire region, thereby lending to the creation of a regional security complex by virtue of 
the existence of a trans-border externality. 
 
“Transborder externalities affect, by definition, more than one state and are, 
therefore, inherently political and strategic…It is this interdependence that creates 
the system; it is the localized nature of many externalities that creates regional 
systems; and it is local security externalities that define regional security 
complexes.” (Lake, 1997: 51-52) 
 
The above reasoning lends itself to the consideration of the Gulf of Guinea as an 
RSC, but it can also be argued that the region had already taken on such a characteristic 
prior to the emergence of the major maritime security challenges of piracy and large-scale 
drug trafficking. While the global extend of the Cold War worked to paint over regional 
complexes and variations,191 the diminishing of superpower rivalry gives an extra emphasis 
                                                          
188 See Lake, 1997: 45-67 
189 “Externalities are costs (negative externalities) and benefits (positive externalities) that do not accrue only 
to the actors that create them” (Ibid: 49) 
190 Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 23 
191 Buzan, 1991: 208 
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to the security management role of RSCs192; thereby satisfying Thompson’s attributes of 
Explicit institutional relations or subsystem organisation and Intrarelatedness.193 
 
2.5 Existing efforts to ensure maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
The increasing importance of the Gulf of Guinea as a maritime route and producer of raw 
materials and energy resources, coupled with the use of the region as backdoor into 
Europe, has seen the international community, regional actors and individual nation states 
launch a long list of initiatives. One of the main drives behind the recognition of the 
importance of maritime security in the region has been two recent UN Resolutions focusing 
specifically on the issue. In October 2011, UN Resolution 2018 brought the issue into the 
limelight by condemning all acts of piracy at sea committed off the coast of the states of 
the Gulf of Guinea, further calling on ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC to cooperate in 
prosecuting facilitators and financiers involved in such activity.194 In February 2012, UN 
Resolution 2012 further added to the earlier Resolution, urging states in the region to 
counter the problem of piracy. This resolution however took an additional step, in 
encouraging actors from outside of the Gulf of Guinea to provide support for regional 
patrols, coordination and strategy.195 However, while the UN may be the focal point of 
efforts to coordinate global politics, it is not a global government.196 Thus such Resolutions 
are still largely little more than encouragement for action by regional bodies and member 
states who have the jurisdiction to intervene in domestic issues. Moreover, there is a 
concern that international initiatives applicable to the region are generally too narrow in 
their focus, in what is a reflection of international community’s overall approach to Gulf of 
Guinea maritime security.197 
 
                                                          
192 Bah, 2005: 79 gives the example ECOWAS’s intervention in the Liberian conflict as a reflection of the new-
found importance of regional security concerns. 
193 Thompson, 1973: 93 
194 UN Security Council, 2011 
195 UN Security Council, 2012b 
196 Nye and Welch, 2013: 196 
197 Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 25 
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While the international community looks to deal with maritime security issues 
directly in the field as noted above, partly by encouraging the fielding assets focused on at-
sea exercises198 or by creating task-specific agencies/institutions,199 the current state of the 
(local) fight against maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea is mainly geared around 
updating national legislation in order to better fall into line with international legal 
frameworks also applicable in the region.200 
 
This legislative push is of course not completely lost on the international 
community, although many of the legislative pieces used to tackle maritime security issues 
in the region, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations 
Convention against illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, were 
originally drafted to deal with very different realities. Ukeje and Movomo Ela correlate 
existing international legal tools applicable to the region into legislation of a repressive 
nature and legislation of a preventative nature.201 Examples of a repressive nature include 
the UN Montego Bay Convention (Law of the Sea)202 and the Convention of Unlawful Acts 
against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.203 An Example of a preventative nature is the 
International Ship and Port Facility Code.204 
 
The same categories are also useful for the division of operational tools applicable 
to the region, some of which are designed to directly intervene as a repressive tool and 
                                                          
198 Examples of such exercises specifically in the Gulf of Guinea region are those spearheaded by the United 
States Africa Command, including AMLEP, Exercise Obangame Express, Exercise Africa Endeavor and Exercise 
Saharan Express. See AFRICOM, 2014 for further reading on these Exercises. 
199 Examples of such agencies include MAOC-N and SEACOP. The former specifically recognises “the 
significance of West Africa as a nexus for the trafficking routes and coordinates (our) activity to engage other 
regional initiatives” (MAOC-N, 2014), while the latter has worked to establish Maritime Intelligence Units in 
countries such as Cape Verde, Senegal and Ghana (SEACOP, 2009)  
200 Mutume, 2007: 3 
201 Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 25 
202 UNCLOS provides the overall framework for territorial limits and passage. See UN, 1982 for the complete 
Convention. 
203 The SUA Convention is a multilateral agreement which criminalises activity which may endanger the safety 
of a ship’s navigation. See SUA, 1988 for the complete Convention. 
204 International Maritime Organisation, 2014 
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some of which are designed to focus on the core issues underlying maritime security 
issues; thereby taking on the form of preventative tools. Repressive operational tools 
compiled by the international community include entities such as MAOC-N, which 
coordinates international counter-narcotics operations by its members states205 and 
SEACOP, which coordinates the training of competent authorities in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
On the supranational administrative level, the Gulf of Guinea straddles two 
different regional supra-governmental organisations,206 both of which have their own 
approaches to maritime security which have developed at different speeds and along 
different vectors, but both of which are crucial for the coordination of maritime security 
policy and the fight against uncivil society207 in the region. The Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS) really began to develop an extensive maritime agenda in 
2009, notably with participation in the creation of the inter-regional Coordination Centre 
for the Maritime Security of Central Africa (CRESMAC) as an agent for the harnessing of 
member state capacities in the maritime domain, as well as the implementation of a new 
Code of Conduct on various maritime security issues208 in the form of a Memorandum of 
Understanding as part of efforts to harmonise maritime security cooperation across the 
Central and West Africa regions.209 Operationally, ECCAS has addressed the daunting scale 
of its maritime jurisdiction by dividing the region into three operational areas, expanded on 
by an additional ECOWAS operational area encompassing Nigeria, Benin and Togo in 2012. 
Complimentarily, as of May 2014 further discussions were on-going regarding the eventual 
application of two additional operational areas.210 
                                                          
205 These member states are France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
206 ECCAS and ECOWAS. 
207 van Langenhove, L and Scaramangli, 2011: 204 
208 “On June 25, 2013, in an effort to help prevent piracy and other illegal maritime actions in West and 
Central Africa, participants in the Summit of the Gulf of Guinea Heads of State and Government…adopted the 
Yaoundé Declaration on the Gulf of Guinea Security. Two key resolutions contained in the Declaration are on 
the creation of an inter-regional Coordination Centre on Maritime Safety and Security for Central and West 
Africa…and the implementation of a new Code of Conduct…” (Library of Congress, 2013) 
209 See ECOWAS, 2013 for a complete copy of the Yaoundé Memorandum of Understanding. 
210 Zone F, covering Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone; Zone G, covering Gambia, Cape Verde, 
Senegal and Guinea Bissau (Vanguard, 2014). 
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Figure 2.9: ECCAS and ECOWAS operational areas 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 36-37 and Vanguard, 2014 
 
While ECCAS has arguably spearheaded maritime cooperation in the region, 
ECOWAS, despite being a relatively more developed economic organisation in comparison 
to its other African counter-parts, first began inquiries into some form of combined 
maritime agendas in 2010. This delay is perhaps not surprising, considering that ECOWAS 
had traditionally focused on a narrower definition of security,211 while maritime insecurity 
for much of the ECOWAS region was (and to some extent still is) seen as a Nigerian 
problem resulting from drawn-out insurgencies in the Niger basin, best addressed on the 
national level.212 
 
                                                          
211 Bah 2005: 82 highlights the need for ECOWAS to strengthen the socio-economic aspects of security, 
including unemployment, disease control, mortality rates and poverty. 
212 Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 23 
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“The Gulf of Guinea has a problem: Nigerian-driven maritime crime. Nigeria’s 
problem in turn is a thoroughly criminalised political and commercial elite and a 
largely disenfranchised electorate. The fallout of that state of affairs has an impact 
on the region’s security and stability.” (Centre for International Maritime Security, 
2014) 
 
However, more recently ECOWAS has lent from the ECCAS model by pushing 
towards greater integration, coordination and information. In fact, the two supra-
governmental bodies are now beginning to overlap to such an extent that ECCAS is 
expected to provide funding to ECOWAS, generated through maritime taxes levied in the 
region.213 To alleviate fears of a Nigerian dominance over ECOWAS activity, a three-tier 
training programme has also been developed to include a wider range of states in the 
region, with Ivory Coast developing tactical training, Ghana developing operational training 
and Nigeria heading strategic training.214 That being considered, Nigeria is still expected to 
take the reins of the regional maritime security effort, with the UN also pushing for 
international assistance in supporting the continuation of joint patrols already being 
undertaken by Nigeria and Benin.215 While we can perhaps expect to see ever-increasing 
roles for regional bodies such as ECOWAS and ECCAS in an attempt to better deal with 
cross-border illegal activity,216 Nigeria’s apparent rise217 does pose an interesting topic for 
debate. Considering the importance given to an equilibrium of power between states in 
regional subsystems,218 the relative power of Nigeria compared to other states in the 
region could call into doubt the definition of the Gulf of Guinea as an RSC and place in 
jeopardy the role of its trans-regional supra-national organisations, thereby leading to an 
                                                          
213 Sekomo, 2013: 9 referencing Commodre K.B. Ati-John 
214 Bah, 2005: 80-81 
215 UN Security Council, 2011 
216 “Transferring a number of government prerogatives to the supranational level allows states to share 
expertise, institutions, tools polices, personnel and funds, in order to better deal with cross-border illegal 
activities.” (van Langenhove and Scaramagli, 2011: 191-192) 
217 Nigeria’s projected population by 2050 is expected to reach 440 million (UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2013), with 10% of all global births occurring in the country by 2050. Moreover, recent studies 
of the country’s GDP, which had not been recalculated since 1990, indicate that Nigeria is Africa’s largest 
economy by far (Provost, 2014). 
218 For example see Buzan, 2007: 178; Thompson, 1973: 93; Lake, 1997: 47 
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internal transformation that moves the region away from an RSC towards a monopolar, or 
hegemonic, complex.219 
 
While compiling a complete list of all domestic approaches to maritime security in 
the Gulf of Guinea would be an impossible exercise, there are a number of initiatives which 
can be cited as prime examples which could arguably be applied by other states in the 
region. Cape Verde makes for an interesting study of national maritime security initiatives 
applicable to research paper’s target geographic area. The archipelago off the African west 
coast is home to the Counternarcotics and Maritime Security Interagency Operations 
Center (COSMAR): With initial support from the United States, the Centre acts as the 
articulation of Cape Verdean maritime law enforcement agencies.220 Cape Verde has also 
acted as a trailblazer in the field of Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET). In working 
around the region’s chronic lack of deep-water maritime assets, the Cape Verdean 
authorities have signed Memorandums of Understanding which allow the country’s 
competent agencies to travel onboard foreign assets for the purposes of tackling illicit 
maritime activity.221 
 
Other states from outside of the region have also contributed to the maritime 
security domain on a unilateral basis, albeit often as part of broader policies or interests. 
France for example is a regular provider of navy assets to the region as part of the nation’s 
ongoing presence in several Gulf of Guinea states, while the USA makes a notable 
contribution through programmes harnessed as part of the Africa Partnership Station 
(APS). The United Kingdom regularly routes warships through the region as part of its 
standard patrol around the Atlantic basin, while Belgium recently included a programme 
with the Cape Verdean authorities in its itinerary as part of its deployment in the APS 
Exercise Obangame Express.222 The Netherlands have also lent backing to maritime security 
                                                          
219 Buzan, 2007: 179 
220 Radiotelevisão Caboverdiana, 2011 
221 See Royal Navy, 2013 for an example of recent LEDET training operations conducted between the Cape 
Verdean authorities and the UK Royal Navy. 
222 Ukeje and Movomo Ela, 2013: 30 
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initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, with the deployment of one of the country’s most modern 
vessels to the West African region on a specific tasking against drug trafficking.223 
 
Considering that it is largely impractical to compile an exhaustive list of all domestic, 
regional and international maritime security programmes/initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, 
the earlier touched upon framework can be further expanded as a method for 
categorisation. Generally, such programmes/initiatives can be divided along 3 axis: (1) 
Preventative vs. Repressive measures; (2) Legislative vs. Operational measures; (3) 
International vs. Domestic measures. 
 
Figure 2.10: Method for categorising maritime security initiatives 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
  
                                                          
223 Koninkijke Marine, 2014 
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3. The Gulf of Guinea - Searching for Potential Solutions 
3.1 SWOT Analysis Elaboration 
 
There can be little doubt that the Gulf of Guinea is becoming increasingly more significant 
in the field of international maritime security. The discovery and development of rich 
hydrocarbon deposits, geopolitical developments in other regions encouraging increased 
volumes of maritime traffic through the area, the Gulf of Guinea’s accessible geographical 
position to the south of the European continent, issues of corruption and the region’s 
porous borders have all contributed to a cocktail of drug trafficking and piracy that has 
seen a rapid rise to the unenviable status of one of the world’s most dangerous maritime 
areas.224 The seemingly unrelenting pace of Globalisation in the 21st century is sure to 
further focus the spotlight of both the regional and international community, as the world 
grapples with what is quickly becoming a hugely significant geographical and geopolitical 
hotspot. 
 
In short, what is arguably at stake is the very stability of the global maritime 
common as it exists today. To better understand the importance of maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea and how the field could potentially develop in the future, the paper will 
make use of the well-established Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
(SWOT) model; with the aim of generating qualitative proposals for 21st century maritime 
security in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
 Used widely as method for structured planning in both the academic and business 
world, the acronym SWOT can more extensively be defined as the role of strengths and 
weaknesses as they relate to our opportunities and threats in the marketplace.225 To this 
end, this research paper’s SWOT analysis is geared around the identification of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current Gulf of Guinea maritime security picture and how 
                                                          
224 International Crisis Group, 2012: i 
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those indicators shape opportunities for proposals and threats in the future of the region. 
Essentially, the aforementioned analysis is broken down as follows (with the first two steps 
acting as sources of opinions and ideas which can contribute to the latter): 
 
 Strengths of the current maritime security situation; 
 Weaknesses of the current maritime security situation; 
 Opportunities resulting from the current maritime security situation; 
 Threats to the improvement of the future maritime security situation. 
 
Figure 3.1: SWOT Analysis method 
 
 
Source: adapted from Mendes Leal, 2011: 73 
 
To better form a more accurate reflection of the maritime security issues currently 
in play in the Gulf of Guinea and to draft more applicable and better suited proposals as to 
the future of the topic, a variety of individuals from several distinct fields and backgrounds 
were asked to respond to a questionnaire. These individuals were also selected and 
grouped using the native and non-native criteria outlined earlier in this paper,226 in order to 
more effectively take into consideration potential variations in opinion. 
                                                          
226 See page 13 
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Table 3.2: SWOT analysis participants 
 
Nº Name 
Native or 
Non-Native 
Institutional 
Background 
Military 
1 Admiral José Saldanha Lopes Non-Native 
Portuguese Navy Admiral 
Former Head of Portuguese Navy Staff 
2 Capt. Lt. José Mário Lopes Tavares Native 
Cape Verdean Coast Guard 
Commander and Director of COSMAR 
International 
Governance 
3 Dr. Ana Cristina Andrade Native UNODC representative in Cape Verde 
4 Dr. Ewa Tomaszewska Native 
Political Matters Representative with 
the Delegation of the EU in Cape 
Verde 
5 Mr. Pierre Lapaque Native 
Regional Representative of the 
UNODC Regional Office for West and 
Central Africa 
Domestic 
Governance 
6 Commander João Fonseca Ribeiro Non-Native 
Director General of the Portuguese 
General Directorate for Maritime 
Policy 
7 Dr. Nuno Pinheiro Torres Non-Native 
Director General of the Portuguese 
Defence Policy Directorate 
NGO 8 Mr. John B. Richardson Non-Native 
German Marshall Fund of the United 
States 
Law 
Enforcement 
9 Mr. Martin Lavahun Native 
Central Intelligence and Security Unit 
in Sierra Leone 
10 Mr. Edmun Landey Tei Native Narcotics Control Board in Ghana 
11 Mr. Frank Francis Non-Native MAOC (N) Executive Director 
 
Source: adapted to this research paper’s sample from Mendes Leal, 2011: 74 
 
3.2 SWOT Analysis on Potential Developments: Results 
 
To gauge the opinion of the experts asked to take part in this study, with the aim of 
identifying the issues influencing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and the 
presentation of proposals for those issues, a series of four questionnaires were prepared; 
compiled in the form of a SWOT analysis. 
 Questionnaire 1: Strengths 
 Questionnaire 2: Weaknesses 
 Questionnaire 3: Opportunities 
 Questionnaire 4: Threats 
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Participants were given a choice of 4 options for each question: 1) not important; 2) 
reasonably important; 3) very important; 4) abstain. The final tallied results of these 
questionnaires are presented in the following tables.  
 
Table 3.3: Results of SWOT analysis on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Questionnaire I 
STRENGTHS of the current maritime security outlook in the 
Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 2 3 4 
1 
Support of the international community in providing 
tools and expertise (i.e. European Union, AFRICOM, 
IMO, UNODC, SEACOP) 
0% 0% 17% 40% 83% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 27% 73% 0% 
2 
Regional initiatives supporting maritime security 
(i.e. The African Union, MOWCA, ECOWAS) 
17% 0% 17% 20% 67% 80% 0% 0% 
9% 18% 73% 0% 
3 
The discovery and development of energy resources 
in the region, giving added importance to the need 
for security in the maritime domain 
0% 0% 17% 80% 83% 20% 0% 0% 
0% 45% 55% 0% 
4 
Increasing availability of local military and law 
enforcement resources in the region 
0% 0% 33% 40% 67% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 36% 64% 0% 
5 
Increasing levels of maritime trade passing through 
the region to other markets, giving added 
importance to the need for security in the maritime 
domain 
0% 0% 33% 100% 67% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 64% 36% 0% 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
  
\ 
Non-native 
Native 
Overrall 
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Questionnaire II 
WEAKNESSES of the current maritime security outlook in 
the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 2 3 4 
1 
Differences in economic development between 
states in the region leading to different levels of 
investment in the maritime domain 
0% 20% 50% 60% 50% 20% 0% 0% 
9% 55% 36% 0% 
2 
The use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area for 
illicit trafficking into other regions (i.e. drug 
trafficking to Europe) 
0% 0% 17% 20% 83% 80% 0% 0% 
0% 18% 82% 0% 
3 
A lack of state resources allocated to the maritime 
security domain 
0% 20% 17% 40% 67% 20% 17% 20% 
9% 27% 45% 18% 
4 
Perceived corruption as a facilitator for illicit 
maritime activity in the region 
0% 40% 50% 0% 50% 60% 0% 0% 
18% 27% 55% 0% 
5 
The transnational effects and reach of maritime 
security issues in the region (i.e. cross-border 
piracy) 
0% 0% 33% 40% 67% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 36% 64% 0% 
6 
Differences in national approaches to maritime 
security policy in the region 
0% 40% 67% 40% 33% 20% 0% 0% 
18% 55% 27% 0% 
7 
Inadequate surveillance systems resulting in a lack 
of maritime domain awareness 
0% 20% 17% 40% 83% 40% 0% 0% 
9% 27% 64% 0% 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
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Questionnaire III 
OPPORTUNITIES for the future maritime security outlook 
in the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 2 3 4 
1 
Increasing international recognition of the need for 
a stable maritime environment in the region 
0% 0% 17% 60% 83% 40% 0% 0% 
0% 36% 64% 0% 
2 
Further international investment in developing 
maritime expertise and resources in the region 
0% 0% 33% 60% 50% 40% 17% 0% 
0% 45% 45% 9% 
3 
The harmonisation of national approaches to 
maritime security in the region 
0% 40% 33% 0% 50% 60% 17% 0% 
18% 18% 55% 9% 
4 
States with additional resources in the region taking 
on a leadership role 
0% 40% 50% 0% 50% 60% 0% 0% 
18% 27% 55% 0% 
5 
Developments in technology allowing for a more 
efficient and cost-effective monitoring of the 
maritime domain 
0% 40% 0% 40& 100% 20% 0% 0% 
18% 18% 64% 0% 
6 
The implementation of an integrated maritime 
policy as tool for bringing together policies and 
capabilities in the maritime domain 
0% 0% 17% 40% 83% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 27% 73% 0% 
7 
The implementation of policies and development 
programmes to address the root causes of maritime 
security issues in the region 
0% 0% 17% 60% 83% 40% 0% 0% 
0% 36% 64% 0% 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
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Questionnaire IV 
THREATS for the future maritime security outlook in 
the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 2 3 4 
1 Increasing levels of maritime piracy in the region 
0% 0% 33% 40% 67% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 36% 64% 0% 
2 
On-going political instability in the region (i.e. 
insurgency, unstable governments) 
17% 0% 17% 40% 67% 60% 0% 0% 
9% 27% 64% 0% 
3 
Differences in levels of economic development in 
the region potentially leading to conflicts and mass 
migration movements 
17% 20% 50% 60% 33% 20% 0% 0% 
18% 55% 27% 0% 
4 
Unbalanced levels of investment in the maritime 
security domain by states in the region 
0% 0% 67% 100% 33% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 82% 18% 0% 
5 
Increasingly sophisticated technology available to 
organised criminal groups, piracy groups etc. in the 
region 
0% 0% 33% 40% 67% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 36% 64% 0% 
6 The corrupting effect of endemic organised crime 
0% 0% 50% 40% 50% 60% 0% 0% 
0% 45% 55% 0% 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
Source: questions elaborated by Risley, 2014. Format adapted from Mendes Leal, 2011: 76-78 
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With regards to an analysis of the aforementioned SWOT Analysis results, one of 
the most notable overall characteristics is the similarity in answers chosen by both native 
and non-native actors. Indeed with the exception of Strengths questions 3 and 5, 
Weaknesses question 3 and Opportunities questions, 1, 2, 5 and 7, both groups chose gave 
priority to the same answer overall (meaning that both groups gave the same importance 
to 72% of the questions asked).227 However, 4 of the 7 questions on which native and non-
native tallied opinions differ are to be found in the results of the Opportunities 
questionnaire, showing a remarkable difference in approach to potential maritime security 
solutions/areas for development in the future. This difference could prove to be 
problematic when drafting proposals and must be taken into account if any eventual 
presented proposals are to be considered as palatable to both sets of actors. 
 
Also noteworthy is the frequency of which the option of Very Important or 
Reasonably Important was chosen by both sets of actors. Whereas Reasonably Important 
scored as the most selected option for non-native actors in just under half of the questions 
asked, native actors overwhelmingly chose in favour of the option of Very Important. 
 
Figure 3.4: SWOT Analysis most Chosen option 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
                                                          
227 Any overall tallied results should take into account the response of one additional native actor in 
comparison to non-native actors (6 native actors responding, compared to 5 non-native actors). 
88%
12%
Most Chosen Option: 
Native Actors
Very Important Reasonably Important
52%48%
Most Chosen Option: 
Non-Native Actors
Very Important Reasonably Important
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The association of high levels of importance to a whole range of issues right across 
the maritime security board by native actors and a considerably lower association on the 
part of non-native actors is supportive of the argument developed in page 13 of this 
research paper, namely that a greater number of referent objects will be of concern in this 
case to native actors by virtue of their geographical proximity. Should the Copenhagen 
School’s method of highlighting survival as being the driving force behind security be kept 
in mind and should it be affirmed that security issues in-region are more likely to threaten 
that survival, then such an association on the part of native actors is of course 
understandable.228 
 
Further notable levels of variation can also be found within each questionnaire. 
Regarding Strengths, 100% of non-native actors considered increasing levels of maritime 
trade passing through the region to other markets raising the need for security as 
Reasonably Important, while one third (67%) of native responses considered the same 
issue as very important.229 
 
Figure 3.5: SWOT Analysis results: Strengths 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
                                                          
228 Examples of this phenomenon can be found for example in Singapore’s security discourse relative to 
terrorism: "When analysed collectively, the ‘alien’ nature and proximity of the threat to ‘home’ not only 
create an acute sense of vulnerability among readers, but also highlights an ambiguity about the boundaries 
and demarcation between danger and security.” (Ying, 2013). 
229 SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths, question 5 
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Such a variation in responses is perhaps unsurprising, considering that the economic 
benefits of increased levels of maritime trade in the region are much more likely to directly 
benefit native actors in comparison to non-native groups. 
  
Another curiosity resulting from the Strengths questionnaire can also be seen in 
responses to the role of the international community in providing tools and expertise to 
the region,230 with a majority in the cases of both groups seeing such support viewed as 
Very Important. This result is particularly relevant for the drafting of proposals for maritime 
security in the region, considering that such support would essentially be provided by non-
native groups, but used by native actors. Also standing out in the Strengths questionnaire 
is one selection of Not Important regarding the role of regional initiatives supporting 
maritime security,231 particularly when considering that this selection was made by a 
responder from the native actors group. While making up 17% of the overall choice of that 
same group with regarding to this issue, this is arguably an extremely relevant indictor of 
in-region approaches towards maritime security. 
 
With regards to responses to the Weaknesses questionnaire, greater levels of 
variation can be found, particularly within the replies of the non-native actors group. 
Notably, at least one responder chose Not Important in five questions of the seven 
questions (of which two responders chose that same option on two of the seven 
questions). The only two questions to which Not Important was not chosen addressed the 
use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area232 and the transnational effects and reach of 
regional security issues.233 Also of relevance was the majority of both native and non-native 
responders selecting Very Important with regards to the use of the Gulf of Guinea as a 
transit area.234 
 
                                                          
230 SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths, question 1 
231 SWOT Questionnaire I: Strengths, question 2 
232 SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 2 
233 SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 5 
234 SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 2 
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Figure 3.6: SWOT Analysis results: Weaknesses 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
 
While non-native actors appear divided regarding the standard of surveillance 
systems available in the region resulting in a lack of maritime domain awareness, 235 an 
overwhelming majority of native actors saw the issues as Very Important. This is a 
particularly pressing issue, should it be affirmed that this research paper’s definition of 
native actors are those more likely to be familiar with the extent of their maritime domain 
awareness by virtue of their position in situ, while non-native actors are likely those who 
are more capable of provide additional resources for the bolstering of surveillance systems 
and who have the tools capable of deep sea deployment and the resulting development of 
a wider maritime picture. 
 
A further interesting result which can be found in the Weaknesses questionnaire is 
the selection of one responder from each group of actors regarding the issue of state 
resources allocated to the maritime domain,236 namely the choice to Abstain. This result 
may be viewed as stemming from the sensitive/political nature of such allocation, with two 
responders choosing the Abstain option as a consequence. 
 
                                                          
235 SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 7 
236 SWOT Questionnaire: Weaknesses, question 3 
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 The overall results of the Opportunities questionnaire also pose some particularly 
interesting variations in options chosen, again particularly between the two groups of 
actors used in this research paper. While 100% of native actors saw the development of 
technology allowing for a more efficient and cost-effective monitoring of the maritime 
domain 237 as Very Important, opinion amongst non-native actors was largely divided (40% 
seeing the issue as Not Important, 40% seeing it as Reasonably Important and 20% seeing it 
as Very Important). Curiously, this issue is arguably made all the more pressing should it be 
addressed in correlation with the standard of surveillance systems available in the region 
resulting in a lack of maritime domain awareness mentioned above in the analysis of the 
Weaknesses questionnaire, where a majority of native actors also saw the issue as 
important while non-native actors were divided. Again, this is an issue which must be taken 
into consideration when formulating maritime security proposals on this topic. 
 
Figure 3.7: SWOT Analysis results: Opportunities 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
 
 Also noteworthy regarding responses to the Opportunities questionnaire is the 
choice by one responder to Abstain regarding further international investment in 
developing regional maritime expertise and resources238, as well as the harmonisation of 
                                                          
237 SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 5 
238 SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 2 
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national approaches to regional maritime security.239 Again, a correlation can be seen 
between similar issues raised as part of the Weaknesses opportunities questionnaire,240 
where one responder from the native actors group also chose to Abstain, along with one 
from the non-native grouping. This result may be viewed as stemming from the 
sensitive/political nature of such allocation, with two responders choosing the Abstain 
option as a consequence. In this light, any proposal regarding the allocation of funding 
and/or resources to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea must bear in mind the 
potential sensitivities of opinion on the issue. Also of interest resulting from non-native 
responses to the Opportunities questionnaire was a 40% selection of Not Important 
regarding states with additional resources taking on a leadership role.241 While such a 
result cannot be taken as definitive indication of potential international support for a state 
located in-region that would be willing to assume a leadership role, it should certainly be 
taken in consideration, as such a leadership role would likely require the backing/support 
of a non-native actor(s) through the provision of additional resources. 
 
Regarding responses to the Threats questionnaire, responses from both groups of 
actors were notably uniform. This is somewhat surprising, giving this paper’s focus on the 
Copenhagen School of thought and its emphasis on survival, as well as the increasing 
significance of a threat based upon its geographical proximity. Moreover, the option of 
Reasonably Important features heavily in the Threats questionnaire results, although Very 
Important would perhaps be expected particularly from native actors. Evidentially there is 
more of a tendency to select Reasonably Important within the non-native group (with 
100% of responders seeing unbalanced levels of investment in the maritime domain by 
states in the region242 as being Reasonably Important), however a more one-sided result 
across the entire questionnaire would perhaps have been expected. 
 
 
                                                          
239 SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 3 
240 SWOT Questionnaire II: Weaknesses, question 3 
241 SWOT Questionnaire III: Opportunities, question 4 
242 SWOT Questionnaire IV: Threats, question 4 
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Figure 3.8: SWOT Analysis results: Threats 
 
Source: Risley, 2014 
 
 One responder from both the native and non-native groupings of actors saw 
differences in levels of regional economic development leading to mass migration 
movement and conflicts243 as Not Important, while one actors from the native grouping 
also saw on-going political instability in the region (i.e. insurgency, unstable 
governments)244 as Not Important. This is indeed a surprising response, considering the 
focus often being given to the regional as a hub of instability by the international press. 
  
                                                          
243 SWOT Questionnaire IV: Threats: question 3 
244 SWOT Questionnaire IV: Threats: question 2 
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4. Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea 
4.1 Proposals for Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
In establishing levels of need and applicability of any proposal for maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea, a projection must inevitably be made as to what significance the area and 
any associated security issues are likely to have in the future. Essentially a calculation of 
risk must be made, based upon identified threats: risk = threat x probability.245 The most 
pressing phenomenon in this sense is without doubt Globalisation. There are countless 
indicators suggesting that this phenomenon is showing no sign of slowing down, with the 
African continent being no exception to the rule. One such indicator of the influence of 
Globalisation in the region is increasing levels of FDI (see table 2.5). Moreover, a number of 
powerful foreign states are already beginning to heavily invest in the Gulf of Guinea, acting 
as yet another indicator of anticipated continued Globalisation of the region; with China 
alone pouring billions of dollars into the area, particularly in oil-rich areas. 
 
Figure 4.1: Chinese investment in the Gulf of Guinea 
 
Source: adapted from Badkar, 2012. 
                                                          
245 Mendes Leal, 201: 80 
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It being established that the Globalisation phenomenon is not likely to slow in the 
region in the short term and, as a result, is likely to increase levels of trade, commerce and 
overall maritime traffic, other indicators for potential maritime security developments in 
the Gulf of Guinea must also be considered, namely the two major issues which are the 
focus of this research paper: drug trafficking and piracy. Specifically relative to drug 
trafficking, reported tendencies suggest that consumption has remained relatively stable, 
despite law enforcement efforts to eradicate plantations; with the overall number of 
consumers increasing proportionally. 
 
“Although coca cultivation has been reduced, it does not appear that cocaine use 
has similarly declined. Based on the data available, the share of the global 
population that uses cocaine seems to have stabilised, but the global population 
has grown, resulting in a larger number of consumers.” (UNODC, 2011: 8) 
 
 Specifically relative to cocaine consumption in the European market, which is of 
great significance to this research paper due to the Gulf of Guinea’s position as a route into 
Europe, available data would suggest that overall trends remain largely unaltered, showing 
a very slight decline over time.246 However, 2013 estimates for the prevalence of cocaine 
amongst all adults from 15-64 years of age in Europe saw the major markets of the United 
Kingdom and Spain maintain rates of over 2%, while prevalence rates rise to over 3% of 
young adults (15-34 years of age) in these same two countries.247 These figures are of 
course of significance when considering that the Gulf of Guinea region is considered as an 
entry point for cocaine destined for the European market. 
 
“Although seizures in the sub region of West and Central Africa remained below 3 
tons in 2012 (including 2.2 seized in Cape Verde alone), cocaine trafficking via 
West Africa to Europe is believed to be continuing.” (UNODC, 2014: 38) 
 
                                                          
246 UNODC, 2014: 37-38 
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Likewise, incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea also show worrying trends. While 
just under 30% of recorded incidents in African waters from 2003 to 2011 (427 out of 
1,434)248 occurred in the Gulf of Guinea, incidents in the area did rise by 73% from 2010 to 
2011249 and are showing few signs of abating. 
 
 With it then being affirmed that the maritime security outlook for the Gulf of 
Guinea is likely to become of greater interest due to the Globalisation phenomenon and 
considering that two of the major maritime security issues appear extremely likely to 
remain present in at least the short to medium term, the need for applicable proposals 
becomes all the more evident. These proposals can be broken down into various vectors: 
 
1. Societal and Economic | addressing the wider issues which contribute to the 
prevalence of maritime security issues in the region: 
a. Programmes to address issues of corruption; 
b. Regional economic development programmes; 
2. Political | The formulation of an maritime security strategy,  considering: 
a. The analysis of the adaptability of existing regional maritime security initiatives; 
b. The analysis of the adaptability of existing extra-regional maritime security 
initiatives; 
3. Operational | The formulation of operational strategies which consider: 
a. Regional capacities; 
b. Extra-regional capacities available to the region. 
 
The above are of course little more than a theoretical starting point which must, for 
the purposes of this research paper, consider the results of its SWOT analysis in order to 
better give feasibility and credibility to any suggested proposals. Furthermore, should any 
such proposals be viewed as applicable and hope to gain any sort of momentum, then they 
would also need to be limited in scope and drafted in consideration of the tools and likely 
                                                          
248 Chatham House, 2013: 1 
249 From 39 incidents in 2010 to 53 incidents in 2011. 
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limited additional resources available. In short, while sweeping proposals and statements 
may have a theoretical application in an ideal scenario, a more limited and calculated 
approach which makes use of existing tools is more likely to suffice in attracting interest. 
Essentially, any proposal must be a) realistic; b) cost-effective; c) applicable on a specifiable 
timescale and d) politically neutral. To this end, the following proposals can be seen as 
feasible: 
 
1. Cost-effective and undisruptive initiatives to tackle corruption and other societal 
issues leading to insecurity in the maritime domain: 
a. Utilise already existing tools, expertise and cooperation to enhance training of 
regional personnel in the financial services sector; 
b. Make use of existing regional and extra-regional financial regulatory bodies to 
monitor suspicious transactions; 
c. Encourage and facilitate greater cooperation between financial regulatory 
bodies and competent authorities for the investigation and prosecution of 
identified perpetrators. 
2. The pooling of already existing intelligence and expertise of private industry and 
competent authorities to address maritime security issues: 
a. Establishment of a regional centre, acting a point of contact for competent 
authorities to cross-reference intelligence on suspicious maritime activities; 
b. Make already existing off-the-shelf software available to the region, to better 
organise and disseminate intelligence on suspicious maritime activities; 
c. Develop relationships with private industry operating in the region to report 
suspicious maritime activities to the competent authorities. 
d. Further expansion of already existing internationally funded programmes to 
neighbouring states. 
3. Ensure correct asset sequencing of both regional and extra-regional personnel, 
tools and assets operating in the area: 
a. Make greater use of the spare capacity of extra-regional personnel, tools and 
assets transiting the region; 
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b. Improve coordination of extra-regional personnel, tools and assets deployed in 
the region so as to avoid duplication; 
c. Further regional coordination of asset deployment, avoiding periods/areas of 
reduced activity and encouraging pooling and sharing to make asset 
deployment more cost-effective. 
4. Make already existing tools available to increase maritime domain awareness: 
a. Increased coordination with advanced extra-regional assets transiting and 
located in the region to report suspicious activity beyond territorial waters; 
b. Make available already existing internationally funded software for the tracking 
of regional maritime activity, making better use of and standardising already 
existing systems (AIS, VMS) and the extra capacity of assets deployed in the 
region (i.e. radar satellite); 
c. The development of a regional early warning system, based upon already 
existing tools and relationships. 
 
4.2 Complementarity of Existing Efforts and New Proposals 
 
For any maritime security proposal to be accepted and perhaps even put into practice, it 
must inevitably take advantage of the lessons learned and resources available through 
already established methods and tools. To this end, the aforementioned proposals are 
drafted with the intention of taking advantage of existing spare capacities or potential, 
while remaining cost-effective and applicable without the need to undertake a long 
political process. 
 
Relative to the implementation of undisruptive initiatives to tackle corruption and 
other societal issues leading to insecurity in the maritime domain,250 similar examples can 
already be found in force around the world. In the European Union, the Third Money 
Laundering Directive251 is used a legal tool for tackling criminal activity which makes use of 
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the financial system for money laundering and is applicable to all banks operating in the 
European Union, as well as all lawyers, notaries, accountants, real estate agents, casinos 
and service providers, as well as all goods sellers when cash payments exceeding €15,000 
are verified. 
 
“Money laundering is the conversion of the proceeds of criminal activity into 
apparently clean funds, usually via the financial system. This is done by disguising 
the sources of the money, changing its form, or moving the funds to a place 
where they are less likely to attract attention…“Criminal activity" includes fraud, 
corruption, drug dealing and other serious crimes.” (Europa, 2013) 
 
Although a specific reference is actually made to drug dealing, the incentive of 
much of the piracy activity in the Gulf of Guinea region stems from a booming black market 
for oil.252 Should tighter controls be made to control this market, piracy incidents may be 
reduced as a direct consequence. Essentially, denying perpetrators of readily available 
methods of laundering and reinvesting ill-gotten funds, no matter what the crime, could 
dissuade such illicit activity in the region. However, it should be noted that the already 
established European legislative system does facilitate the introduction and application of 
such initiatives. To this end, any similar development in the Gulf of Guinea could either a) 
be tailored on a national level by individual states or b) could be encouraged by well-
established and respected supranational entities and focal points such as ECOWAS and 
ECCAS. Although no doubt difficult to institute, such an initiative would make use of 
already existing financial transaction data to highlight suspicious activity, rather than push 
for the creation of a new and potentially costly process. Moreover, many of the financial 
institutions and services operating in the region are global brands which, either directly or 
through sister companies, already have experience and exposure in working with anti-
corruption legislation elsewhere. There are of course already existing bodies designed to 
tackle corruption, such as Liberia’s General Auditing Commission and the Liberia Anti-
                                                          
252 UNODC, 2013: 45 
Page | 91 
 
Corruption Commission,253 however the launching of a legislative tool specifically focusing 
on private industry would potentially deter any direct state involvement. 
 
Regarding the pooling of already existing intelligence and expertise of private 
industry and competent authorities,254 there are likely cost and operational efficiencies to 
be had for both parties; thereby encouraging such activity. In a region in which 
approximately one third of oil production capacity is located offshore,255 private industry is 
potentially act as a source of reporting on suspicious maritime activity in the region which 
can be put to good use by the competent authorities. Already located in the region, there 
are few costs impeding the pooling of such intelligence. Moreover, regional initiatives 
which currently act as focal points for law enforcement and military information 
coordination, such as the Africa Partnership Station and Cape Verde’s COSMAR, already 
have a solid foundation in place which can potentially be complemented by the expansive 
maritime picture developed by constant commercial maritime traffic and oil exploration. 
 
The European Union’s Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme 
(CRIMGO), which is a wide-ranging initiative supported by the EU Instrument for Stability, 
as well as France, Portugal, Spain, the UK, Finland, Italy and Poland, is a notable example of 
international efforts to better the coordination of Gulf of Guinea maritime authorities, but 
it is essentially an initiative which focuses on ensuring maritime governance, rather than a 
tool which looks to get to the very heart of the causes of maritime security issues.256 
 
The transnational nature of maritime security raised in this research paper must 
also be considered. With maritime crimes often stretching over several national 
jurisdictions, there is a likelihood that various states will be able to contribute to a broader 
picture, capable of tackling a particular threat with greater efficiency. For example, 
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maritime piracy is often viewed as a largely Nigerian-based phenomenon, although it is an 
issue which leaves traces right across the entire region.257 Moreover, the investigative and 
information gathering tools which could be provided by the international community 
through initiatives such as SEACOP, the IMO, AFRICOM and which were highlighted as an 
important strength to both native and non-native actors258 can be further bolstered by 
readily available information from private industry that is often exercising activity in 
locations far from territorial waters, where many of the Gulf of Guinea’s states have a 
limited operating capacity. Plans are already in place to expand existing maritime zones, 
such as the implementation of an ECOWAS Zone F and G,259 however such an expansion 
may run the risk of being over-reliant on already stretched national resources in areas 
where private industry may have a regular presence. 
 
Relative to the correct asset sequencing of both regional and extra-regional 
personnel, tools and assets operating in the area,260 there are a number of extra-regional 
initiatives and assets which operate or transit through the area which could be better 
coordinated in order to ensure that a duplication of efforts is better dispersed in a way that 
avoids extensive periods of inactivity. Such examples include the United Kingdom Royal 
Navy’s regular passage through the area, which has already been used to good effect as an 
opportunity to provide training to regional actors,261 and the Belgium Navy’s recent 
exercise in the area which utilised spare capacity while on route to an APS exercise in the 
Gulf of Guinea.262 However, such initiatives often see assets from various states deployed 
to the region during the same period, leading to a duplication of efforts, a duplication of 
training and avoidable periods of inactivity. Considering that many of the nations which 
deploy to the region, i.e. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom 
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and the United States, can potentially be coordinated by already existing entities such as 
Europe’s MAOC-N, there is a clear opportunity to ensure more cost-effective and 
operationally efficient asset sequencing that would benefit both regional and extra-
regional bodies; thereby providing a solution to one of the weaknesses which attracted 
curiously diverse levels of opinion in this paper’s SWOT analysis.263 
 
Regarding the use of already existing tools to increase maritime domain 
awareness,264 which was highlighted as an issue by the native actors group in this research 
paper’s SWOT analysis,265 there are a number of tools which can be better exploited in 
order to develop a more complete maritime picture in the region. Information could be 
sourced from private industry already present in the area to complement existing tools, 
while advanced military assets navigating the Gulf of Guinea or orbiting the region could 
provide data which could be used in the construction of an image that reveals what is 
actually happening in what is still one of the world’s most unknown maritime areas. 
Moreover, already existing and commercially available tracking tools such as AIS and to a 
lesser extent VMS have proven successful in enhancing this maritime picture, as was the 
case with the SeaVision project which worked with 20 African nations to maintain AIS 
receiving stations.266 Database tools provided by programmes such as SEACOP267 can also 
make an important contribution and should be rolled out to additional states in the region, 
while simultaneously encouraging the use and dissemination of information sourced 
through such assets. Essentially, there is little need for additional investment in this 
proposal, but rather a better, wider and more standardised use of tools which have already 
been developed and which, in many cases, are available at virtually no cost though already 
existing international programmes. 
  
                                                          
263 SWOT Analysis: Weaknesses, question 3. Non-native actors responded 20% Not Important, 40% 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Maritime security is without doubt poised to become one of the major topics of discussion 
for the international community as the 21st century progresses. While the world’s oceans 
have played a fundamental role in shaping society as we know it today, be it through early 
exploration, expressions of military might by imperial powers or even as the mode of 
transport used by the first mass migratory movements, Globalisation has once again 
morphed the maritime vector into the lifeline driving development and expansion. Even 
through times of economic crisis, international trade, fuelled by the maritime sector, has 
continued to boom. Indeed, from 2000 to 2008, total world trade grew at almost double 
the rate of global GDP growth.268 The emergence of potentially huge global economies and 
their ever-increasing demand for fuel, minerals and consumer goods has only worked to 
contribute to the expansion of the maritime sector,269 while a massive development in 
shipping registries has enabled the industry to take advantage of cheaper labour and 
subsequently reduce shipping costs and lower prices at the actual point of consumption. As 
staggering as it is, 90% of all trade is now moved by sea.270 Only 23% of global trade is 
between countries that actually share a land border and it is the shipping industry that 
overwhelmingly dominates the rest of the field.271 
 
 The undeniable significance of maritime trade will inevitably see maritime security 
attract the spotlight and the Gulf of Guinea is no exception. Huge hydrocarbon reserves, 
increasing interest and investment by some of the world’s major economic powerhouses 
and the continuing growth of the global maritime industry overall has already seen 
maritime security become one of the major issues of the day in the region. To a certain 
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extent, the international community has already heeded the call, with everything from 
economic entities such as ECOWAS, military bodies such as AFRICOM and mission-specific 
agencies such as MAOC-N, to name just a few, focusing their activity on the region. 
 
 While maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is without doubt of vital importance 
to the international community, it is also a topic with an undeniable application in the 
region itself. The Niger Delta’s energy reserves are a huge source of revenue, particularly 
for the regional giant Nigeria,272 and are dangerously reliant on safe maritime routes. 
States such as Benin are massively dependent on revenue generated from taxing ships 
moving through the region, while others source much of their food from the oceans. 
Regional actors such as Cameroon and Ivory Coast, to name just two examples, have taken 
steps to bolsters their maritime security footprint, while supranational entities such as 
ECOWAS and ECCAS have made remarkable efforts to better police maritime zones. 
 
 However, while being a source of almost unimaginable potential wealth and 
development, the Gulf of Guinea maritime outlook is also the source the region’s most 
pressing security concerns. A quirk of geography means that this massively diverse region 
of West Africa is perfectly positioned as an entry point for illicit trafficking bound for 
lucrative markets further north and the collateral damage being caused to already fragile 
governments is alarmingly dangerous and destabilising. Corruption facilitates illicit activity, 
which in turn feeds more corruption in an aggressive spiral273 that is proving difficult to 
halt. Some West African nations have been battered by Latin American trafficking gangs at 
even the top echelons of governance and society. Guinean states officials having been 
associated with cross-border cocaine trafficking, the Gambian president dismissed the 
national head of the police, the head of the navy, the deputy head of the army and even 
the head of the National Drug Enforcement Agency for involvement in narcotics 
                                                          
272 Nigeria is believed to have raised more than 400 billion USD from oil sales since the beginning of the 
1970’s (Mendes Leal, 2011: 88) 
273 Decludt, 2013 
Page | 96 
 
trafficking274 and Sierra Leone’s Minister of Transportation was forced to resign after his 
cousin was associated with an aircraft used to transport a notable quantity of cocaine.275 
 
 Perversely, oil wealth is not only one of the Gulf of Guinea’s biggest source of 
wealth, but also the biggest source of its increasingly biggest headaches: piracy. The black 
market trade in stolen and bunked fuel, re-sold both in and out of the region,276 is the 
biggest motivation for such incidents. In what is a staggering example of the interplay 
between the region’s states, oil giants and military forces, allegations have also been made 
of payments by private companies for protection of their interests; contributing to funding 
for militant groups who in turn have links to piracy and drug trafficking themselves.277 
 
“Extortion: oil companies pay protection fees to communities and security 
companies to ensure pipelines are not sabotaged…Groups such as the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta admitted to stealing and smuggling oil. This 
theft was rationalized as re-appropriation of wealth and as a form of protest, but 
the line between political and criminal activity has always been blurry.” (UNODC, 
2013: 45-46) 
 
On many levels both drug trafficking and piracy can of course be traced back to the 
same root topics. A developing but still young sense of civil society in need of careful 
nurturing, compounded on by a difficult economic climate and often chronic lack of 
resources, opens up the Gulf of Guinea maritime vector to actors who would look to 
exploit it. It is for all of the above reasons that proposals for dealing with potential 
maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea must be made. The importance of global 
maritime trade and the sinister activities that can be conducted on the world’s oceans is of 
such a vital importance to 21st century society that ground work must be done to ensure 
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that the Gulf of Guinea is prepared with the best available tools for taking on such a crucial 
maritime security role. 
 
 Serving as a base for the SWOT analysis that followed, this research paper began 
with an academic approach to maritime security. The perspective offered by the 
Copenhagen School offers a useful insight into how securitising actors play a definitive role 
in bringing security issues to the forefront and worked as a foundation from which this 
research paper’s differentiation between native and non-native acts could be developed. 
Moreover, the speech act set out by the Copenhagen School is likely to be important in the 
future, as both regional and extra-regional actors look to draw attention to maritime 
security issues. On the flip side of the coin, approaches to the Gulf of Guinea by the 
international community also offer an interesting slant on the securitisation of a particular 
issue in a situation where that securitisation has either a) become more of a semi-
permanent reality rather than an exceptional way of addressing a particularly pressing 
issue and b) become an issue that is better addressed by a re-politicisation and de-
securitisation. Taking into account the results of this research paper’s SWOT analysis, 
maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea a safe bet to become a hugely pressing issue for the 
international community. A total of 88% of the questions asked to native actors were seen 
as  Very Important, while 52% of non-native actors also had the same response. 
 
 In conclusion, there are no doubt many other initiatives which can add further to 
the proposals made in this research paper. However, any proposal hoping to be adopted 
without the backing of a notable regional or extra-regional actor would better succeed if it 
satisfies the 4 criteria earlier described, namely the ned to be a) realistic; b) cost-effective; 
c) applicable on a specifiable timescale and d) politically neutral. There are already 
countless maritime security initiatives championed by a hugely diverse range of actors in 
the Gulf of Guinea, perhaps the challenge is harnessing them rather than pushing for the 
creation of more.  
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“MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA: ISSUES AND 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY” 
Questionnaire 
 
NAME  
COMPANY/INSTITUTION  
DATE  
 
Note: 
The following questionnaire is divided into four sections, each with a series of 
statements which should be classified from 1 to 3 (1: not important; 2: reasonably 
important; 3: very important) relative to how important you consider each 
statement to be in relation to the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Should you wish to abstain from 
comment on any particular statement, please choose 4. 
 
ALL ANSWERS WILL BE ANALYSED AND RECORDED ANONYMOUSLY 
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Questionnaire I 
STRENGTHS of the current maritime security outlook 
in the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 
Support of the international community in 
providing tools and expertise (i.e. European 
Union, AFRICOM, IMO, UNODC, SEACOP) 
1 2 3 4 
2 
Regional initiatives supporting maritime 
security (i.e. The African Union, MOWCA, 
ECOWAS) 
1 2 3 4 
3 
The discovery and development of energy resources 
in the region, giving added importance to the need 
for security in the maritime domain 
1 2 3 4 
4 
Increasing availability of local military and law 
enforcement resources in the region 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Increasing levels of maritime trade passing 
through the region to other markets, giving 
added importance to the need for security in the 
maritime domain 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
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Questionnaire II 
WEAKNESSES of the current maritime security 
outlook in the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 
Differences in economic development between 
states in the region leading to different levels of 
investment in the maritime domain 
1 2 3 4 
2 
The use of the Gulf of Guinea as a transit area for 
illicit trafficking into other regions (i.e. drug 
trafficking to Europe) 
1 2 3 4 
3 
A lack of state resources allocated to the maritime 
security domain 
1 2 3 4 
4 
Perceived corruption as a facilitator for illicit 
maritime activity in the region 
1 2 3 4 
5 
The transnational effects and reach of maritime 
security issues in the region (i.e. cross-border 
piracy) 
1 2 3 4 
6 
Differences in national approaches to maritime 
security policy in the region 
1 2 3 4 
7 
Inadequate surveillance systems resulting in a lack 
of maritime domain awareness 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
  
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities – Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Master’s Degree in Political Science and International Relations - Academic Year 2013/2014 
SWOT Analysis 
Page | 113 
 
 
 
Questionnaire III 
OPPORTUNITIES for the future maritime security 
outlook in the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 
Increasing international recognition of the need for 
a stable maritime environment in the region 
1 2 3 4 
2 
Further international investment in developing 
maritime expertise and resources in the region 
1 2 3 4 
3 
The harmonisation of national approaches to 
maritime security in the region 
1 2 3 4 
4 
States with additional resources in the region 
taking on a leadership role 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Developments in technology allowing for a 
more efficient and cost-effective monitoring of 
the maritime domain 
1 2 3 4 
6 
The implementation of an integrated maritime 
policy as tool for bringing together policies and 
capabilities in the maritime domain 
1 2 3 4 
7 
The implementation of policies and 
development programmes to address the root 
causes of maritime security issues in the region 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
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Questionnaire IV 
THREATS for the future maritime security outlook in 
the Gulf of Guinea 
IMPORTANCE 
1 
Increasing levels of maritime piracy in the 
region 
1 2 3 4 
2 
On-going political instability in the region (i.e. 
insurgency, unstable governments) 
1 2 3 4 
3 
Differences in levels of economic development 
in the region potentially leading to conflicts and 
mass migration movements 
1 2 3 4 
4 
Unbalanced levels of investment in the maritime 
security domain by states in the region 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Increasingly sophisticated technology available 
to organised criminal groups, piracy groups etc. 
in the region 
1 2 3 4 
6 
The corrupting effect of endemic organised 
crime 
1 2 3 4 
 
1 = not important; 2 = reasonably important; 3 = very important; 4 = abstain 
 
